CONFIDENTIAL 


A 





Presented to v 



WARNER 

OBJECTIVE SIGHTING SYSTEM 


FOR 


United States Springfield Service Rifle Model 1903 


O UR national security, indeed the very national existence 
itself of these United States may shortly depend upon the 
speedy training of 500,000 men who can shoot to hit.” 

Nearly four years of experiment and development by a 
corps of expert riflemen and mechanics have perfected a 
simple mechanism which enables the common soldier to 
adjust his battle sight accurately to range while under fire, by 
a movement as instant, direct and automatic as that by which 
he throws in a cartridge or pulls trigger, and to do so without 
once taking his eye from the individual enemy he has 
determined to hit. “It’s the hits that count.” 


To double the efficiency of battle marksman¬ 
ship, reduce waste of ammunition and elevate 
morale of troops is to turn the scale of war. 











































I ' 

















































■ 






















































FOR CONFIDENTIAL USE ONLY 


This announcement concerning development of the Warner Objective Sighting 
System has been printed principally for the information and reference of members of 
the Board of Ordnance and Fortification and of officers of the School of Musketry, U. S. A. 
A limited number of copies have also been struck off for other officers of the Govern¬ 
ment and of the Army and Navy and for civilians who have given to this work the 
benefit of important advice and assistance. 

To the perfection of this system, which had its crude beginnings nearly four years 
ago, there has been devoted the skill of a corps of experts of distinguished ability in 
their several professions. It would be scarcely possible for one unacquainted with 
the work to believe what a wide area of effort has been covered in study of the subject 
of field sighting from every angle, and in design, construction and trial of one mechanical 
device after another, in the very earnest attempt to fairly exhaust the subject and finally 
to produce the simplest and best form of practical every-day service sights for rifles, and 
particularly for military rifles. 

As to military rifles, the results are herein described. The Objective Sighting of 
hunting rifles — a very different matter as to mechanical particulars — is also touched 
upon as of collateral interest at this time but must await a less disturbed condition 
of affairs for announcement in detail. 

This work has from the very start proceeded with due regard for secrecy, and no 
publication of any item of information concerning the same has been permitted. A 
considerable number of perfected sights are about to be subjected to a series of com¬ 
parative tests covering problems of fire, attack and defence, at the United States School 
of Musketry, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and in Massachusetts at ranges especially prepared for 
this purpose. 

Upon completion of all these tests this manuscript may be released for general 
publication. Meanwhile, the recipient hereof is respectfully requested to safeguard 
the same and retain it in his personal possession. 


Copyright, 1915, Robert r L. Warner 
All rights reserved 

Republication of any portion of this manuscript, save by written permission of the author, is expressly forbidden 


PRESS OF GEO. H. DEAN 
BOSTON. MASS. 


OCT 15 1915 









Captain James H. Keough, Sixth Massachusetts Infantry, firing U. S. Springfield rifle with Warner Objective Battle Sight. 
In upper figure he fires at object dimly seen in grass, distance estimated 400 yards. In lower figure, observing shot 
to throw up sand short of his objective, he removes finger from trigger to set sight up to 500 yards without removing eye 
from objective, after which he makes second shot hitting the object. 







WARNER 

OBJECTIVE SIGHTING SYSTEM 


A successful attempt to repair fifty years’ 
neglect of a vital function of firearms. 

With high appreciation of encouragement received 
from the Secretary of War and the Board of Ordnance 
and Fortification, and with grateful acknowledgment 
to soldiers and riflemen who have contributed to this 
work much expert advice and assistance, including 
particularly General Charles K. Darling, Captain 
Stuart W. Wise, Captain James H. Keough, Mr. 
Walter S. Wait, Mr. Adolph O. Niedner, Mr. George 
F. Day and Mr. Edward P. Warner. 

'T'C AYGA ■Vvtr*-'- 



“One thing is absolutely true — that no important achievement 
has ever been accomplished in any avenue of human activity that 
has not had, as one of its basic forces, the rule of accuracy.” 





CONTENTS 


1. Frontispiece Capt. Keough Shooting 

PAGE 

2. Fundamental Facts. 7 

3. Warner Objective Sighting System.20 

4. Our Mexican Neighbor.33 

5. Shots at Random.37 

6. Expert Opinions.46 

7. Clippings.52 

8. Illustrations.57 


9. Hunting with Objective Sights 


67 








** 2 -) 'if 


FUNDAMENTAL FACTS 


0 


The decision of war depends upon success in injuring the enemy while 
avoiding return injury. This is fundamental, and the main chance of suc¬ 
cess lies in the shoulder arm. No weapon of offence or defence has yet 
been devised which will take the place of the individual shoulder rifle 
when aimed to hit\ 

This has been true in modern military operations generally and is true 
of the present European conflict, in spite of the unprecedented development 
of artillery fire which has characterized some phases of this war. Certain 
writers whose attention has been arrested by the spectacular injuries inflicted 
here and there by high explosive shells, or by the deadly results from fire 
of machine guns at points especially favoring their use, have jumped to the 
conclusion that wars are hereafter to be fought by artillery, and a promi¬ 
nent educator has even gone so far as to suggest the abandonment of pres¬ 
ent forms of shoulder arms in favor of a rapid fire gun to be carried by each 
man. 

In support of this argument it has been suggested that men formerly 
carried very heavy shoulder arms and can therefore do so again; that a man 
can if necessary carry a rapid fire weapon weighing possibly seventeen or 
eighteen pounds, and that with such a weapon, “firing 500 shots a minute” 
he will become irresistible as compared to the present infantry-man. 

It is unfortunate that these commentators do not carry their argument 
a step further and explain who is going to supply this soldier with ammu¬ 
nition, which he is to shoot at the rate of 500 shots per minute. At twenty 
cartridges per pound, 500 cartridges weigh twenty-five pounds, and it does 
not take much pencil and paper to demonstrate that at this rate one man 
with such a rapid fire gun could explode a ton of ammunition within two 
hours. 

It has been stated that the German commanders are content if they 
kill one enemy per ton of ammunition expended. It is not out of reason 

7 


that this may in fact be so, for that would in cartridges mean 40,000 cart¬ 
ridges, and by comparison, in the Russo-Japanese war, deaths are stated to 
have been in the proportion of one to 20,000 cartridges consumed. 

Considering the enormous stores of ammunition which the Germans had 
accumulated for this war, and the exceptional facilities of transport by rail 
and auto car which enable them to pile ammunition up to the firing line, 
it might readily be granted that they would expend ammunition per emeny 
killed at twice the rate of the Russo-Japanese war. 

All this, however, constitutes but a weak argument in favor of equipping 
infantry altogether with rapid fire guns instead of shoulder arms of substan¬ 
tially the present form. Not every contestant in war has ready for hostil¬ 
ities enormous stores of ammunition nor is he able to do a large percentage 
of his fighting concealed in five hundred miles of deep trenches, and closely 
backed by a net-work of railroads and thousands of auto cars. 

The conditions which have resulted in such great use of artillery and 
rapid fire guns, principally by the Germans and French, are special con¬ 
ditions, and while, under these special conditions, the proportions of casual¬ 
ties due to artillery have, particularly during the last nine months in Bel¬ 
gium and France, been, so far as can be determined at this time, con¬ 
siderably greater than in other recent wars, even at some points and for 
a few weeks extending to 50 per cent of the total, still it is by no means 
certain that the same thing will be found to have been true of the tre¬ 
mendous wide sweeping field movements of the Teutonic and Russian 
armies in the eastern field of operations. 

It would not be at all surprising to careful students of military mat¬ 
ters, to learn when this war is over and the statistics are all available, 
that the total casualties due to artillery have not, on the whole, been appre¬ 
ciably greater than in other recent wars. In the American Civil war ninety- 
one per cent, of the casualties were inflicted by shoulder arms. In the Russo- 
Japanese war eighty-four per cent, of injuries were due to shoulder arms. 
The other sixteen per cent., included every nature of injury, whether from 
artillery, sabers, bayonets, kicks of horses, stones, or otherwise. 

The operations of modern artillery, like those of the aeroplane and 
submarine, are highly spectacular, but we must not for this reason be drawn 
into any hasty conclusions with regard to the further usefulness of the 


8 


battle ship or the shoulder rifle. As a matter of fact, great changes in all 
human affairs proceed slowly. Every department of military activity must 
be judged at its own worth and its rise or fall will depend upon its develop¬ 
ment of actual efficiency in real service, and not upon its spectacular features. 

There have always been those who would sweep aside all previous 
engineering accomplishments of the age, at the appearance of a new factor. 
The announcement of the telephone was to be the death knell of the tele¬ 
graph, but the telegraph has since multiplied an hundred fold. The wire¬ 
less was to send all wires to the scrap heap, but the use of wire lines in the 
United States since the invention of wireless has multiplied perhaps ten 
times. Electric light was to put the gas companies out of business, but the 
gas business is better today than ever before. Similar examples from engi¬ 
neering history could be recited almost without limit. 

It is the business of engineers, including the military engineer, to weigh 
each element dispassionately, and to assign to each its true relative value 
after expert study of the facts. Under the average conditions of great mil¬ 
itary operations, including the entire world, an average of difficult terrain, 
poor transportation, and the necessity of speedy mobilization of hostile 
operations in unexpected directions, either for advance or retreat, the 
main chance has always lain in the infantry, and there is nothing up to date 
to indicate that it will not always lie there, or that the operations of the 
battle ship, submarine, artillery, machine gun or cavalry, will not still in the 
last analysis all have to be considered as preparatory to the effective oper¬ 
ations of infantry, which must achieve whatever victory may be the 
ultimate purpose of a war-like operation. 

It goes without saying that every department of military engineering 
should be persistently developed to its highest possible efficiency, but con¬ 
sidering the importance of this arm, this is especially true of infantry 
and infantry equipment, and it is particularly true in regard to the infantry 
of nations which are animated by no aggressive policy, but which depend 
rather for defence in the greater part upon volunteer citizen soldiers. 

The very earliest operations of the present conflict brought this fact out 
sharply. It was the superior shooting of the individual British soldier which 
enabled England, illy prepared, lacking artillery and ammunition, yet still 
to throw her small force into the balance in France and help save Paris from 
the on-rushing German hordes, without courting disaster. 


9 


The later stages, and the crucial stages of the drive for Paris were neces¬ 
sarily so swift that machine guns and artillery played the smaller part; the 
fate of Paris actually hung at the last upon infantry fighting and shoulder 
arms, and at the English end of the line the superior battle marksmanship of 
the British soldier enabled the small British force to out-fight its antagon¬ 
ists three to one. 

Our American military problem is for much the greater part a problem 
of defence; a problem of utilizing a small regular army and a volunteer 
army, at present small, and in any event but of moderate proportions, to 
defend quickly any point of two very long coastal frontiers, thousands of 
miles apart. This will have to be done by infantry capable of speedy move¬ 
ments by rail and on foot, with adequate but not clumsy or disproportionate 
support of aeroplanes, artillery, cavalry and the like. 

The infantry is, and the infantry, so far as human experience up to date 
indicates, will continue to be the most important arm of the service, and 
the various problems of infantry equipment are, therefore, the most impor¬ 
tant problems of equipment with which the service has to deal. 

An old Company Commander, in a communication to the Army and 
Navy Journal of January 25, 1915, says: 

“After all, the fundamental duties of Infantry are only three: Hike , Dig , 
Hit. Hike, so as to reach the place in good time and in good condition; 
Dig, enough to construct the simple shelter trenches required by modern 
combat; Hit the other fellow first , hit him hard , quicker and harder and oftener 
then he can hit back. The Infantry that can do these things will win on any 
battlefield; and of all these the crux> the climax , the very reason for the exist¬ 
ence of Infantry is to hit.” 

If then, in the final analysis the infantry be considered the most impor¬ 
tant branch of the service, and if the very reason for its existence is to hit, 
it seems very logical to conclude that the weapon with which the infantry¬ 
man does his hitting is the most important single item of military equip¬ 
ment, and that hardly any greater service for defence can be rendered than 
to actually improve in a small or great degree the hitting efficiency of the 
infantryman’s weapon — the shoulder rifle. 

A great amount of military engineering talent of the highest order has 
been devoted to the improvement of the character and management of the 

10 


shoulder arm, with the resultant modern development of small calibre, 
steel jacketed projectiles and smokeless powder, fired from rifles of good 
mechanism, adapted to rough usage. 

Among the best of these weapons, if not the very best of them all, is the 
United States Springfield, Model 1903 Military Service rifle. Granting 
the excellence of this weapon in most respects, there has yet remained the 
supreme necessity of making its fire hit the enemy while in the hands of a 
common soldier of average intelligence, but for the most part of limited 
actual experience in warfare. This depends upon two things, viz.: morale , 
that is to say, the soldier’s nerve , and mechanism of direction , that is to say, 
his battle sight. 

Target sighting under the cheerful conditions of peace is a well-developed 
art. Battle sighting remains substantially where it stood at the time of 
the American Civil War. There has been practically no advancement in 
this regard in fifty years. 

Not only has this resulted in stupendous waste of ammunition, but also 
in vital injury to morale. A man who knows his gun will not hit anything 
save by chance, wants to run away, and most of the casualties inflicted with 
present battle sights are a matter of chance. 

Earl Kitchener and Lord Roberts both declared at the beginning of the 
present war that marksmanship would be a most important factor in the 
war, and this opinion has since been supported by statements of many com¬ 
manders of prominence in the various armies, and has in fact been generally 
recognized by military men of experience of every army. 

Nevertheless, the operations of all modern armies have been character¬ 
ized by stupendous wastefulness of ammunition and it has been difficult to 
improve the marksmanship in war of the common soldier, because it has 
been necessary for ninety-nine per cent, of soldiers to use a single battle 
sight, correct for only one range, over-shooting everything within that 
range, under-shooting everything outside it. 

There has been available no mechanism which could save by a small 
fraction of sharp-shooters, be adjusted to range under fire. To permit most 
soldiers to adjust target sights under fire is equivalent to shooting all ammu¬ 
nition harmlessly into the country behind the enemy, for such adjustments 

11 


made in action by ninety-nine per cent, of men invariably produce the 
wildest over-shooting. 

This accounts for the rule that, save for sharp-shooters, there must in 
action be used only the single battle sight. In the case of the United States 
service rifle this sight is correct at 547 yards, and over-shoots everything inside 
that range , from several inches to several feet . 

The short-comings of this system of fire have been generally recognized 
by officers of practical experience, but by no one has the necessity for good 
marksmanship and the reasons for the lack of it among American infantry, 
and to a greater extent among the infantry of almost every other nation, 
been more clearly brought out than by Major John H. Parker of the 
Eighth U. S. Infantry in his admirable article in the Journal of the Military 
Service Institution for March, 1915, entitled “Some Observations on Infantry 
Technic,” and from which I quote a few expressions at random: 

“The facts remain: A company composed of good riflemen is sure to 
give a good account of itself in a fight. A company composed of poor rifle¬ 
men may be coached by expert officers and non-commissioned officers (if 
any are available) into some semblance of real efficiency in action; but a 
company of good riflemen will go ahead without officers, if necessary, and 
render effective service. American troops have done this time and again.” 

“It can be maintained that recruits are rarely natural good shots; that 
the handiness of the American of today is not equal to that of forty years 
ago, or that of fifty years ago; and that we shall not have good, well-trained 
riflemen unless we spend the necessary time on that subject to get the 
desired result.” 

“One single shot, an aimed shot, by a sharp-shooter, pointed to hit a 
particular man at 700 yards, and which hit him, had probably as much 
effect in hastening the surrender as all of the thousands of bullets fired 
from the gatling guns; for that shot brought down General Linares, the 
Spanish commander. When we talk about depreciating the value of certain 
kinds of training, let us throw a brick at the fellow who depreciates marks¬ 
manship. Usually the man who talks that way is maneuvering army divi¬ 
sions in his mind on a map. Generally he has had little or no experience 
in actual warfare; certainly very little in scouting, patrolling and in the 
bushwhacking sort which was most of the Philippine warfare.” 


12 


“Of the three fundamental duties of the infantry to shoot, and to shoot 
to hit, is the most important by far, the one for which infantry exists, and 
without which it has no reason for existence. And in proof of the correct¬ 
ness of this, just let any one of the modern school say which he would prefer 
with him on a dangerous mission with a patrol of one platoon — a platoon 
composed of men who can shoot straight and hit , or one composed of men 
who cannot. Remember, about ninety per cent, of infantry duty will be 
encounters of small detachments, patrols, advance guards, outposts, forag¬ 
ing parties, attacks of guerrillas, where it is all over in ten minutes except 
burying the dead and caring for the wounded.” 

“In the last few years a good deal has been said about the small difference 
in effect between the fire of good and that of poor shots in action. Much has 
been said about ‘cones of fire,’ ‘beaten zones,’ and ‘collective effect.’ Above 
all, more recently, great stress has been laid upon the extreme value of ‘super¬ 
iority of fire’ through ‘rapidity of delivery.’ Eight to fifteen shots per 
minute per man is the latest accepted doctrine, and we are urged to ‘over¬ 
whelm the enemy,’ get ‘superiority’ of fire at the earliest possible moment; 
generally we are told that this can be best accomplished by a tremendously 
rapid rate of fire. Nobody has yet told us how we are going to get ammu¬ 
nition at the short ranges where battles are decided , if we shoot ft away in 
the first part of the fight.” 

“Our experiments showed that there is what might be called a critical 
range, beyond which more hits can be expected if the ammunition is fired in 
a machine gun, and within which more may be expected if it is fired by the 
men. That critical range, as should have been expected, was at about the 
limit of individual aim — about 700 yards.” 

“The scientific thing to do is to turn loose the machine guns at the longer 
ranges, and hold back the infantry fire until men can select their individual 
targets .” 

“Let us quit preaching waste of ammunition', it is too valuable in a fight; 
the supply is too limited .” 

“I have never been able to understand the pseudo logic which perfects 
an accurate instrument and then imposes conditions which prevent the user 
of that instrument from availing himself of its accuracy. That is the condi¬ 
tion we have in using the ‘battle sight.’ The rifle is one of the most perfect 


13 


instruments ever made. With a properly adjusted sight, hitting is merely 
a question of holding. But with the ‘battle sight’ holding must be off , 
instead of on, the target; the rifleman has no definite point of aim, but must 
estimate the number of inches he must hold off the point to be hit, as well 
as estimate the range. Such estimates introduce an element of inaccuracy 
which cannot be neutralized by any amount of skill.” 

In emphasizing these remarks of Major Parker and others, in regard 
to individual marksmanship, I would not be understood to minimize the 
value and necessity of training of marksmen to co-operate effectively as an 
organization. We cannot have individual marksmen going off on their own 
hook and get any considerable results from military operations. This has 
been very well pointed out by Captain Henry E. Ames of the 28th U. S. 
Infantry, whose experiments have demonstrated that individual training of 
riflemen alone is not sufficient, but granted equal training in field exercises, 
it can hardly be doubted that the company of expert battle marksmen will 
defeat two or three times their number of trained men who cannot make 
hits, for it’s the hits that count. 

Ninety percent of cartridges now fired in battle might better be taken 
to sea in lighters and dumped overboard, for as now used after much diffi¬ 
cult and costly carrying about, the firing of it only wears out rifles and 
impairs morale without even annoying the enemy. This is for the greater 
part the fault of established systems of battle sighting. 

To the great question of battle marksmanship, therefore, which, consid¬ 
ering all the facts, is, it seems to me, the most important technical military 
problem now demanding solution, a corps of experts of the highest skill, whom 
I have brought together, have devoted themselves for over three years. 

We believe that we have solved the problem; that we have developed a 
new principle of firing rifles in warfare, and that we have perfected a suc¬ 
cessful mechanism for the application of this principle to service conditions 
of all sorts. 

The task we laid down for ourselves was this: We must enable the soldier 
to sight his rifle accurately while under fire by an operation as simple, posi¬ 
tive, automatic and as nearly subconscious as that by which he now throws 
in a cartridge or pulls trigger, and he must be able to do this instantly, from 
range to range, while his eye and his mind are kept constantly focused upon 
an individual enemy. 


14 


Judging by previous standards this seemed to be impossible. Never¬ 
theless, after making and trying dozens of devices, employing every sort of 
mechanical principle, we have accomplished it. 

The device we have produced we call the Warner Objective Sight, for 
the reason that it enables the soldier to keep his eye and his mind upon his 
objective and gets him out of the subjective state of mind. In a word he 
thinks about his enemy instead of about himself , and he can hit his enemy , 
his objective. 

This result has been declared by military officers of experience to be the 
most important development in the practical use of shoulder arms since the 
invention of smokeless powder. They have declared after shooting our rifles 
objectively sighted that such sighting will for a given expenditure of ammuni¬ 
tion in battle increase the hits tenfold. We believe it would be not too much 
to say that it will enormously reduce waste of ammunition, increase greatly 
the number of hits which can be made in a given time, prolong the life of rifles 
in service, elevate morale of troops and turn the scale of war. 

Imagine a rush on trenches. From where I sit near the New England 
coast between Boston and New York, the waters of a small bay are visible 
a thousand yards away. We are on a little rise with open fields about — 
an admirable spot for quick trenching against coastal landing parties. The 
water is shallow but will accommodate lighters for troops and the spot is 
favorable for seizing an important railroad junction. 

Yesterday a hostile squadron heavily shelled and crippled nearby forti¬ 
fications, and during the night several regiments of our infantry have been 
rushed by rail to defend points favorable for landing all along this coast. 
Here we have only four companies, but all well dug into trenches by day¬ 
light and ready for business. 

At earliest dawn a flotilla of enemy lighters is seen drawing up to shore 
and a regiment of infantry are embarked — three times our number! Our 
position is quite unknown to them, but lies directly in the path of their 
advance. Our movement has been so hasty that we have not been able 
to bring along any ammunition to waste, having only about 150 rounds 
per man. It will not do at all for us to shoot it all away at fifteen shots 
per minute for the first ten minutes, for if we do we shall most assuredly 
be beaten. 

The ground over which the enemy must advance is slightly undulating, 

15 


marshy, with scattering small ' pines, patches of high grass and two or 
three fields of corn 4 or 5 feet high. Also it is crossed by several drainage 
trenches. 

The limit at which it is possible to distinguish an individual man moving 
across such ground is about 700 yards. Consider first the nature of the 
fight which is about to take place if we be equipped with single battle 
sights, correct only at 547 yards. If warned by our officers to shoot at 
individual targets and avoid waste of ammunition, we shall at 700 yards 
make some few hits, for we are going to overshoot enough under these 
circumstances so that our 547 yard sight will be tolerably good at from 
650 to 700 yards. The hits, however, will probably not exceed one in 100 
shots, and if our company has seen no previous service, and has only been 
recruited within a year, they will probably at this range not exceed one 
in 500 shots. 

At 600 yards we shall do a little better. As the enemy advances now 
by short rushes, plunging down into cover and returning our fire, it will 
be very difficult to make any hits at all. Groups of fifty or an hundred men 
rise suddenly and make a quick run of fifty yards and disappear. They 
run so fast it is impossible to shoot at them, and while we can see them 
disappear, we are sure to overshoot them now more and more, for they 
are at 400 yards or 350 yards, and our “battle sights” are beginning to help 
the enemy as the range decreases. 

It begins to look bad, for their numbers are but little diminished. We 
are sure to get somewhat rattled and as they get in to 250 yards we are 
overshooting them three or four feet in spite of the constant warnings of 
our officers to “hold under.” 

The last 100 yards is free of cover, but men rushing forward cover 100 
yards in a very few seconds. We shall come to bayonets outnumbered 
two to one, with but one possible result. When outnumbered you have 
got to stop the enemy by hits for you cannot beat him at cuts. 

With Objective Sighting, on the other hand, we shall at 600 yards begin 
shooting with deadly accuracy and with perfect confidence in our weapons. 
As the enemy drops into cover at 500 yards he will find himself suffering, 
even at this great range, more casualties than expected, for we are accu¬ 
rately sighted and are shooting directly at the spot into which he has dropped. 

16 


At 400, our sights again accurate, will enable us to begin getting rather 
important results. At 300, the sights again accurate, firing at objectives 
seen to move, or seen to drop into this bit of cover or that, we are sure to 
hit hard, and the enemy is at a great disadvantage by reason of the fact 
that he is attacking up rising ground, can barely see our hats, is winded 
with running and falling, and is in all probability using the ordinary battle 
sight, inaccurate save at one range. 

At 200 yards the casualties which he suffers will be terrific, and we 
should not have twenty men hurt. All this gives us great confidence and 
injures his morale. Every one of us is watching for a given enemy and 
shooting at him. One of two things is sure to happen; either we shall 
come to bayonets on even chances, or more likely, the demoralization of 
such deadly fire will stop him, and as he breaks back for the shore his 
punishment will continue until he has got out beyond 500 yards. Before 
he can be strongly reinforced a battery of artillery has come to our assist¬ 
ance and the day is saved. 

In recent conversation with an experienced rifleman who had been shoot¬ 
ing a United States service Springfield rifle at one of our Massachusetts 
ranges, first with regular service battle, and afterward with Objective 
battle sight, I said: “From my own experiences with both hunting and 
military rifles Objectively sighted, and considering the present great waste 
of ammunition in battle, the time it takes to waste it and the ground gained 
by the enemy while it is being wasted, I feel no doubt whatever that the 
installation of Objective sights upon the service rifle of the United States 
Army will double the battle efficiency of our infantry — the strongest arm 
of the service — and turn many a defeat into victory;” to which he replied: 
“What you say is perfectly true, but only too conservative. The fighting 
value of our infantry would be far more than doubled, for I think that the 
change in sights would multiply the hits in battle more nearly by ten than 
by two and it’s only the hits that count.” 

Having produced a battle sight adapted to these ends we have attempted 
to combine with it substantial improvements of the target sight also, and 
have succeeded in producing a very lively micrometer adjustment for the 
use of sharp-shooters, thus providing for this important branch of the service 
more successfully than has been done heretofore. 

The net result is this: We have enabled the common soldier , not in ten 


17 


seconds or twenty seconds , with warm fingers and cool nerves , hut instantly 
with fingers numb and nerves hot , to change his battle sight with deadly accuracy 
and always with his eye on the enemy, and 

We have provided the sharp-shooter with a target peep sight which he can , 
even with numb fingers adjust almost instantly and with great accuracy to any 
range up to and including 2000 yards. 

We have fortunately been able to arrange for the production of these 
sights in the excellent shops of the Greenfield Tap and Die Corporation at 
Greenfield, Mass. This concern, one of the largest of its class in the world, 
enjoys an enviable reputation as a skilled manufacturer of instruments of 
precision, and has long been relied upon by many of the best known Amer¬ 
ican Engineering Works as well as by several of the Government Arsenals, 
for the construction of dies and gauges as standards for fine work. 

We have had little difficulty in convincing the officers of this progressive 
concern that the practical development of the Objective theory of battle 
sighting and fire control constitutes an advance in the art of war of the first 
importance, and they have willingly placed their exceptional manufacturing 
facilities at the disposal of this production as a very practical contribution 
to the efficiency of national defence. 

They are now equipping a special shop with automatic machinery which 
will enable them shortly to produce our sights in large quantities, of Mark I 
model, for instant sliding into the windgauge base of United States Spring- 
field rifle, model 1903, in substitution for the present service sight. 

With their help we hope to convert the “Zone of Danger” into a Zone of 
Hits — to resight the rifles of a nation and thus at a stroke to double its effec¬ 
tiveness in battle. 

If we are really to prepare for defence we should start by recognizing 
that the Fates protect the efficient — not the negligent. War is a business 
proposition. It is no answer to this statement of fact to call it “unfeeling” 
or “horrible.” We shall make no permanent progress toward decreasing 
or abolishing war until we are willing to start by facing the fundamental 
facts. 

We live for posterity and “business” is simply organized effort to pro¬ 
vide food, clothing and shelter for the benefit of posterity. When compe¬ 


ls 


tition in this business becomes too keen, Nation A begins killing the men 
of Nation B, in order to safeguard supplies of food, clothing and shelter 
for the posterity of Nation A. 

When a war, dreadful as it is, has thus been started, the anguish and 
burden of it are only intensified and prolonged by inefficiency, and what 
shall be said of the business efficiency of a war management which expends 
a ton of material to do work which, at maximum efficiency, requires less than 
one ounce. 

A ton of ammunition with the rifles which its shooting consumes, are 
worth over $2,000. Even if with proper battle sighting we made only one 
effective hit in one hundred shots, and I believe we should do much better, 
we should, as compared to this maximum of inefficiency, save $2,000, and 
also economize other things much more valuable, viz.: the life and strength 
and morale of our own soldier. Even if the cost in dollars did not count, 
the value of ammunition and guns when really needed on the battle line 
simply cannot be measured, for in the “crisis of the offensive,” depending 
so often in its final stage upon ammunition supplies, national existence 
itself may be at stake. 

If we would defend our supplies of food, clothing and shelter for our pos¬ 
terity without supporting the burden of a great standing army, we must develop 
superior business efficiency for a smaller army. 

The sight of a rifle seems a little thing, but, like the small periscope of a 
deadly submarine, it is absolutely vital to effective work. Its imperfections 
are multiplied tenfold in wastefulness of ammunition and impairment of 
morale. Every improvement in its practical effectiveness on the firing line 
which can be accomplished, is worth an hundred times its cost in resultant 
improvement of morale, increase of casualties of the enemy, saving of ammu¬ 
nition, prolonging of the life of the rifle and saving of the valuable life of our 
soldier himself, who has at so great an expenditure of time and national wealth 
been clothed, trained and transported to the firing line with the whole final 
object of making the greatest ultimate possible number of hits while avoiding 
injury to himself. “It’s the hits that count.” 


Robert L. Warner. 


50 Congress Street, 
Boston, Sept., 1915. 


19 


WARNER OBJECTIVE SIGHTING SYSTEM 

“How does it feel to be under fire?” inquired a visitor to the British lines 
in Belgium. “Most of the time we are so far under the fire that it does not 
feel at all” was the reply of the soldier. 

In the field of action overshooting is universal. Every experienced 
hunter of big game knows this, and everyone who has seen troops in action 
knows it still better. Even the veteran hunter, or the veteran soldier, long 
experienced at the targets, and with nerves hardened by a lifetime of prac¬ 
tice, still finds it almost impossible in the heat of action, with the best sighted 
rifle, to hold his fire closely down to his objective. 

This is due principally to the fact that he is unable, in attempting to 
keep his eye upon his objective, to avoid getting too much of his front sight, 
or too little of his rear sight, and he can only get himself better in hand to do 
this as he gains confidence in the accuracy of his firearm. 

The moment he begins to feel that he has in hand an arm inaccurately 
sighted, which he cannot by any means available adjust instantly to an 
accurate sighting, he is irresistibly and unconsciously impelled to make up 
for this inaccuracy by throwing more shots. 

This condition of impending panic as his game begins to get away, or his 
enemy begins to fire back at him, accelerates rapidly until the hunter or 
soldier, as the case may be, finds himself firing wildly with no result what¬ 
ever, except to destroy the morale of himself and those about him. 

The tendency to over-shoot accelerates rapidly with men less hardened, 
achieving finally, in the case of a raw recruit, a nearly unconquerable impulse 
to blaze away with his gun at hip, injuring nothing save by the merest 
chance, and only wasting a scandalous weight of ammunition. 

This is mainly a matter of psychology, and our chief effort must be 
directed to helping the man achieve a better control over his mental proc¬ 
esses and his own nerves by simplifying and perfecting his control of fire; 
to establishing firmly in his mind a subconscious habit of reliance upon his 
ability to adjust his battle sight to range accurately, instantly and auto¬ 
matically. 


20 


During twenty years rifle mechanisms and ammunitions have enor¬ 
mously improved, but rifle sighting for battle service has stood still. The 
old leaden slug with low velocity, falling rapidly to the ground after the 
first few yards of flight, has given place to the steel, or copper-covered sharp 
pointed projectile of small calibre, propelled by smokeless powder at such 
great speed that considerable improvement of fire is achieved solely by 
reason of the consequent flatter trajectory. 

Concurrently, mechanisms of loading and discharge have also been 
greatly improved, and one unfamiliar with the facts might be excused for 
assuming offhand that some substantial advancement must also have been 
made in the theory and mechanism of directing these high-speed projectiles 
effectually against the enemy under service conditions, but the contrary is 
the fact. 

In respect of battle sighting we are hardly better off than at the time 
of the American Revolution — the farmers of Concord and Lexington used 
flint-lock guns having no rear sight whatever, with a larger percentage of 
hits than are scored with modern weapons in battle. 

A recent English volume by a well known author, which describes in 
interesting detail all manner of firearms, including military shoulder rifles, 
to the extent of eight hundred pages of text, devotes to the matter of mil¬ 
itary sights only a single item about five lines long. 

This illustrates very well the prevalent practice which generally is to 
carry the development of the military firearm very carefully up to a point 
where it is almost fit to hit something, and then balk at the task of furnishing 
it with a simple means of accurate adjustment to its supreme purpose of 
making hits. 

It would scarcely be exaggeration to declare that no improvement what¬ 
ever in battle sighting of shoulder arms has been made in fifty years. Many 
target sights of fine mechanism, at the summit of which stands the telescope 
sight with its delicate adjustments, have enabled individual sharp shooters, 
well sheltered from weather, with warm hands, at known ranges, against 
plain targets, to do good shooting. 

As a factor in war, however, this is almost negligible, not only because 
these fine mechanisms will not stand the great abuse to which they are 
unavoidably subjected in war, but more especially because in war not one 

21 


soldier in a thousand is able to use them at all, and even the sharp shooter 
himself can hardly use them in heat of action with fingers numbed by cold 
or rain. 

Many of the great armies in battle depend for the major part upon a 
single sight, subject to no adjustments for different ranges. The excellent 
United States Springfield service rifle, for example, one of the best of modern 
military weapons, carries a battle sight correct at 547 yards, and greatly 
overshooting everything inside that range, and our work with the Ross 
Canadian service rifle indicates overshooting with the battle sight of from 
two to seven feet at ranges from 100 to 500 yards. 

In other words, in order with standard battle sights to hit an enemy at 
moderate ranges with either the United States or Canadian rifle, you have 
got to shoot “under” him from two to seven feet, unless he has obligingly 
consented to help you out by standing up full height. 

This is not the fault of drill masters or army officers. They very wisely 
forbid the indiscriminate raising of target sights by common soldiers, well 
knowing that to permit this would generally result in a pushing up of the 
target sight to ranges many hundreds of yards beyond the objective. It 
has been generally necessary for them to fall back upon a rule forbidding 
the raising of these sights, save by sharp shooters. 

The remaining result has been called “zone firing,” and in the attempt 
to find an excuse for it there has been developed the theory that firing with 
these single battle sights creates a “zone of danger” several hundred yards 
in extent which is unhealthy for a man six feet high. This “zone of danger” 
argument depends for its support upon the hypothesis that enemies stand 
around at full height within the “cone of fire.” 

Returning to fundamentals, however, it is apparent at a glance that in 
only a small percentage of cases is any enemy seen standing full height 
within the “cone of fire” determined by such battle sights. He is in trenches, 
or in bushes or woods, behind dead horses, crawling through the grass, 
stooping for a quick dash and plunging down again behind any convenient 
cover. 

He is seen to move behind his cover, or in the bushes or grass; he presents 
an objective not six feet high, but possibly eighteen inches high, and very 

22 


often merely an indistinct small movement of something at some point in 
the terrain. If the eye be fastened upon this movement, as upon the falling 
golf ball, and an attempt be made to guess the range, there may be hope of 
hitting him. 

Let us suppose that he is three hundred yards distant. With our battle 
sight we have got to hold several feet “under" him. In looking for this place 
several feet under him we lose him. If we look from him to adjust our sight 
we lose him. If we could keep our eye firmly fixed upon him, or upon the 
spot where the movement took place, right where we know he is although 
we cannot now see him any more than we could see a golf ball which had 
dropped right there, and if we could by a movement, simple, subconscious 
and automatic, adjust our sight instantly and accurately to that range as 
we judge it, we should make a deadly shot. Or, if it be not deadly, we 
should judge ourself to have guessed the range too far or too near, and if 
we could then by a simple movement — simple as that by which we throw 
in a new cartridge — adjust the sight for the nearer or farther range, we 
should make a deadly shot. 

And these very things we can do with the Objective Sight. With this 
sight our aim may instantly be made correct instead of approximate for any 
determined range lying within a practical field of vision. 

The highly unsatisfactory character of the results achieved by estab¬ 
lished systems of rifle fire as demonstrated during wars of the very recent 
years in Africa, Asia, Mexico and Europe, has been emphasized in numer¬ 
ous editorial comments of the general press and special articles of military 
authorities in the scientific and technical journals, calling attention to the 
great importance of accurate marksmanship as perhaps the first lesson to 
be learned from these wars. 

The value of marksmanship has always been well recognized by Amer¬ 
ican commanders, and in fact, English speaking governments generally 
have for centuries encouraged the development of marksmanship by rifle 
practice. See for example, the curious 33d Statute of Henry VIII, which 
seems to fall particularly pat at the moment, considering the present activ¬ 
ities of Americans generally in matters pertaining to defence: 

“Provided alway, and be it enacted, etc., that it shall be lawful, from 
henceforth, to all gentlemen, yeomen, and serving-men of every lord, spiritual 

23 


and temporal, and of all knights, esquires, and gentlemen, and to all the 
inhabitants of cities, boroughs, and market towns, of this Realm of England, 
to shoot with any hand-gun, demihake, or hagbut, at any butt or bank of 
earth, only in places convenient for the same; so that every such hand-gun, 
etc. be of the several lengths aforesaid, and not under. And that it shall 
be lawful, to every of the said lord and lords, knights, esquires, and gentle¬ 
men, and the inhabitants of every city, borough and market town, to have 
and keep in every of their houses such hand-gun or hand-guns, of the length 
of one whole yard, etc., and not under, to the intent to use and shoot in the 
same, at a butt or bank of earth only, as is above said, whereby they and 
every of them, by the exercise thereof, in form above said, may the better aid 
and assist to the defence of this Realm, when need shall require, etc” 

It is hard to understand why the improvements in mechanisms of war 
should have been so persistently accompanied by increased waste of ammu¬ 
nition, and in fact this wastefulness seems to have been very marked from 
the earliest introduction of fire arms. Fremantle in his “Book of the Rifle,” 
quotes an amusing proof of this fact from a book, “Instructions for the 
Warres,” translated from the French by Paul Ive in 1589, as follows: 

“The Harquebusse hath bin inuented within these fewe yeares, and is 
verie good, so that it be vsed by those that haue skill, but at this present 
euery man will be a Harquebusier: I knowe not whether it be to take the 
more wages, or to be the lighter laden, or to fight the further off, wherein 
there must be an order taken, to appoint fewer Harquebusiers, and those 
that are good, than many that are worth nothing: For this negligence is 
cause that in a skirmish wherein tenne thousand Harquebussados are shot, 
there dieth not so mutch as one man, for the Harquebusiers content them¬ 
selves with making of a noyse, and so shoote at all aduentures.” 

Wastefulness of ammunition for one cause or another has been char¬ 
acteristic in a greater or less degree of all modern wars. It is stated, for 
example, that in the battle of Salamanca 3,500,000 rounds of rifle ammu¬ 
nition were expended, resulting in only 8,000 casualties; that is to say, one 
hit for 437 shots. Military science must indeed rest under a grave indict¬ 
ment of inefficiency when we consider that even so late as the Russo-Japanese 
war the best it could do after expending untold treasure in equipping and 
transporting great bodies of troops to the firing line, was to get one dead 
enemy for 20,000 cartridges. 


24 


That our own army chiefs realize the need of improving individual as 
well as collective battle marksmanship, has been well shown by the encour¬ 
agement given our efforts by the Board of Ordinance and Fortification, 
and is indicated by the following quotations from memoranda dated May 
ii, 1915, addressed to the President of the National Rifle Association by 
Brigadier-General A. L. Mills, Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, and 
approved by Mr. Henry Breckenridge, Assistant Secretary of War. 

“The habit to be acquired through target practice is that of employing 
only aimed fire. We do not expect accuracy, but we may hope for a reason¬ 
able percentage of hits” 

“Individual marksmanship is only a step toward the collective marks¬ 
manship without which battle fire cannot be effective. ’ ’ 

Circular No. 3, this office series of 1914, says: 

“The efficiency of the squad, including its leadership, is the basis of 
efficiency, and this efficiency in turn depends on the thoroughness of the train¬ 
ing of individual members of this unit.” 

Granting that our battle sight should, in the first instance, be adapted 
to meet the greater need of the greater number; that is to say, of citizen 
soldiery of limited training and possibly little or no training at the butts, 
nevertheless the skill of marksmanship resultant upon long training at the 
butts is always very important when it can be had. 

Consider for example the fight between 500 men of the Sixth Massachu¬ 
setts Volunteers against approximately 800 Spaniards during the Spanish 
War near Guanica, Porto Rico. Hardly more than an affair of the out¬ 
posts, it yet serves to illustrate the difference between aimed and unaimed 
shooting. 

The firing began about midnight and continued intermittingly until 
after sunrise when a sharp action took place. The advantage lay with the 
Spaniards for the reason that they were concealed in tropical growth, while 
the Americans advanced through and across open valleys to dislodge them. 
The Sixth Massachusetts is a regiment of marksmen, the teams of this 
regiment having repeatedly beaten all comers from the regimental teams 
of the United States Army and Volunteer Militia. 


25 


The Spaniards on the other hand had limited training at the butts, but 
depended upon the “Zone of danger” principle. Note the result: 

Casualties to Spanish: Killed and wounded 52. 

Casualties to Americans: Wounded 4. 

An officer of the Sixth Massachusetts, in explaining this result, says : 
“They did not aim at us individually — we did aim at them individually.” 
And he says also, that “the casualties to the Spanish would have been two 
or three times as great if the Americans had been able to aim directly at 
individual Spaniards as seen occasionally moving through the cover, instead 
of being obliged to aim under them with the United States battle sight; 
that is to say, if the Sixth Massachusetts had been equipped with Objective 
Sights, the same casualties would have been inflicted in shorter time with 
much less expenditure of ammunition, or in the same time with same ammu¬ 
nition the number of casualties would have been trebled.” 

“Volley firing” of rifles means overfiring 999 times out of 1000. It is 
identical with the attempt of an amateur to hit a deer or even a quail. A 
Tyro upon seeing two or three deer in a perfectly open place, will begin 
blazing away at them as rapidly as he can, but hitting no deer. The veteran 
will coolly aim carefully, low down on the fore shoulder of one deer, and 
bring him down with one shot. 

It is the same thing with quail. Many times one sees a Northern man 
in Southern game fields banging both barrels of a shot-gun at a flock of 
rising quail, but never a quail comes down. After he has done this many 
times, hitting no quail, he begins to realize that the Southern hunter beside 
him is shooting each barrel of his gun at a single quail upon which he has 
fixed his eye the moment the flock rises. When the Northern sportsman 
goes to try this, he will to his surprise soon begin to drop a couple of birds 
from each rising flock, the birds upon which he has concentrated instantly 
his eye and all his mental power. He has substituted “Objective firing” 
for “volley firing.” 

“Volley firing” will be necessary at times. It is not always a matter of 
lying in trenches and under good cover. Masses of men must occasionally 
charge against other masses of men, firing volleys, but this volley firing 
should, so far as possible, be directed against individual enemies over sights 
adjusted to the lowest possible range. Volley firing against troops, as at 

26 


present conducted, is in the main a pure waste of ammunition, since present 
battle sights are arranged for over-firing even at moderate distances. When 
troops get in hand the objective sight, and for volley firing are under orders 
to use it at the lowest range and are taught to shoot at individual enemies so 
far as possible, even under such circumstances, the increase of mortality 
among the enemy will be relatively as great as it is when for volley firing 
against quail, there is substituted objective firing. 

Students of psychic phenomena declare that the human brain is divided 
into two departments; the objective mind, which deals consciously with 
external objects; the subjective mind, which deals subconsciously with the 
internal affairs of the body. The subjective mind is unconsciously con¬ 
cerned with the welfare of the body — with self-preservation. It causes 
the soldier to dodge the whistling bullet which has already passed his head, 
it inspires him to flight. It is not concerned with team play, it looks out 
only for the individual; it impairs morale. 

If we would make of our man a good soldier, we must keep him out of 
the subjective state of mind by focusing his mentality upon an external 
objective. The Objective Sighting System is a long step in this direction. 
The soldier may now keep his eye and mind focused upon his enemy and 
escape the voice of the subjective mind. Instead of hearing that voice 
say: “I am in danger — the enemy has his eye on me — my weapon is inac¬ 
curate — I must flee,” he says consciously: “There is the enemy, I have my 
eye on him — I can hit him, for my weapon is accurate.” 

He has got out of the subjective state of mind into the objective state 
of mind — his value as a soldier has been doubled. 

The extreme importance of accurate battle sighting is well emphasized 
by the numerous photographs now coming from the front in Europe and 
portraying eloquently the conditions under which millions of men along a 
battle line of five hundred miles are day by day exerting their wits to avoid 
exposure, while taking advantage of every exposure upon the part of a 
single individual enemy. No “zone firing” about this. It is a matter of 
watching for the movement of an arm, or head beside a clod of earth, or 
behind thin bushes fringing trenches. 

The range is now well known from days or weeks of firing, or from the 
officer’s range finder. The enemies’ cap dimly seen through that tuft of grass 

27 


is 200 yards away. It is equivalent to an eight inch bullseye, but it does 
not stand out boldly and black against a white piece of paper. It will not 
suffice to shoot four feet over it, and it is impossible to hold four feet under 
and hit it. 

It will be difficult, very difficult indeed at best, to hit it even with a sight 
accurately adjusted at 200 yards, and quite impossible otherwise. Our 
soldier, realizing this fact, slips back into the trench and begins the difficult 
and slow adjustment of his target sight to this range. As he returns to the 
edge of his trench one of two things happens. Either his movement attracts 
the fire of the enemy and he himself goes back with a broken shoulder, or, 
if he escapes this, he finds that his tuft of grass is one of many—he cannot 
now pick out again the one which dimly shields his objective. 

I have before me at the moment a picture of a soldier, prone, amongst 
thin bushes ten or twelve inches high, rifle extended in front of him, cap off, 
face blackened, watching the head and shoulders of an enemy sentry beyond 
the rise across a little valley. I imagine he is studying the range; that he 
has just concluded it is about 300 yards; that he wishes to high heaven 
there were some means whereby he could slip his right hand forward to his 
sight, constantly watching that sentry, to be immovable when he turns, to 
adjust that sight with certainty to 300 yards, return his finger to the trigger, 
pausing motionless when the sentry turns, then with deadly certainty bring¬ 
ing him down. 

But he has not the means to do so. He must withdraw his rifle from 
in front of him, rise upon his elbow to get at the sight, look down upon it 
and begin to adjust it. He knows that he must do this and he does not dare 
try it, for if while at it the sentry turns, it will result in discovery. He 
will take a chance, therefore, in hope of a score, and ten chances to one he 
will miss his man. 

Such work takes place many times within five or six hundred yards. 
Even a full sized man standing erect and motionless, makes a poor mark at 
five hundred yards. The French have therefore wisely included the follow¬ 
ing in their catechism of a soldier in time of war: 

“When I am alone, I will not fire at more than 400 meters (435 yards) 
on a single man, or at more than 600 meters on a group of men.” 

The Objective Battle Sight, model Mark I, which we are now making 

28 


for the United States Service Rifle, is accurate at ranges from 200 to 600 
yards, and the 700 yard range is also added objectively by picking up the 
leaf sight, for the open sight on top of the leaf slide set at its lowest point, 
stands at 700 yards, and can be thrown up instantly without taking the 
eye from the enemy. 

In the event that the Board of Ordnance and Fortification should 
adopt our sights, I should personally strongly recommend reducing the 
lower range to 100 yards and the 700 yard range to 600 for the reasons 
above mentioned, and for the further reason that this would tend to put 
an additional restriction upon the everlasting and universal over-shooting 
in general. And I should recommend this in spite of the fact that the 
excellent United States service rifle sighted accurately at 200 yards will 
over-shoot less than three inches at 100 yards, for in trench warfare extreme 
accuracy at 100 yards has come to be recognized as vital to the most effec¬ 
tive work. 

General French, commenting upon the development of accuracy of fire 
between the trenches in Belgium, some of which are only seventy-five yards 
apart, says: “For the slightest undue exposure the heaviest toll is exacted.” 

Even at 100 yards an individual enemy moving in cover is not easy to 
hit, and a difference of three or four inches may make the difference between 
a broken arm and an enemy uninjured. I am disposed to think the 
battle sight should be absolutely accurate at 100 yards, and absolutely 
accurate at every 100 yards up to and including 500 yards. The common 
soldier should not be permitted to attempt adjustments beyond 500 yards 
or 600 yards. Sharp-shooters only should be permitted to attempt the 
raising of sights beyond this range. 

Let us see then what would be the essential characteristics of an ideal mil¬ 
itary rifle sighting mechanism for all purposes. In the first place it should, as 
to every adjustment, be a single handed, right handed sight, that is to say: it 
should be feasible to make with the right hand every adjustment of either the 
battle sight or target sight while the left hand is entirely devoted to holding 
the rifle or to steadying it firmly if prone upon the ground. Every adjustment 
should be one which a soldier can make between the thumb and forefinger of his 
right hand to any desired position, quickly and accurately, while holding his 
weapon comfortably in his left hand and without turning it around sidewise 
into any unnatural or uncomfortable position. Then, having due regard to 
the main chance, we must first of all present a good battle sight for the 


29 


common soldier. This should be strong, of neat appearance, offering no sharp 
projections to catch upon the clothes, instantly ^adjustable to extreme ac¬ 
curacy, and should afford a reading scale at natural angle to the eye for use 
when desired with the word “yards” plainly stamped in. 

A new soldier in the field will not otherwise be always sure of what his sight 
means, whether yards, meters, or what. All battle sights should be marked 
in full figures, viz.: 200, 300 yards, instead of 2, 3, etc. We must not leave any 
room for the common soldier to doubt at any time when he stops to look at his 
battle sight what it actually means — it must mean at a glance clearly “300 
yards,” etc. 

The battle sight should operate by the most natural movement of a knurled 
trunion head between the thumb and forefinger, extended straight out from 
the body along the barrel while lying prone, close to the ground. 

It should be simple in construction, reduced to the lowest possible number 
of pieces, designed for demounting without tools, very durable and subject to 
the least possible injury by rust, sand, water, snow and the like. 

It should be so easy to adjust that with the coldest fingers any man can 
instantly set it to the range desired, but so well held in position that it cannot 
slip or move from an adjusted range, save at the will of the operator. 

These important points are, however, all secondary to the factor of principal 
importance, viz.: The battle sight must be adjustable by the soldier under all 
sorts of conditions with absolute certainty of range while he keeps his eye con¬ 
stantly upon his objective and lies close to the ground. 

Having first achieved these things we may attempt to provide for the 
important business of the sharp-shooter at long range. Let us suppose 
that an officer on the firing line has, with his binoculars, observed officers 
of the enemy to come and go from a small house distant upon the terrain, 
determined by range-finder to be 1200 yards away. Here is a job for sharp¬ 
shooters. A dozen officers and orderlies have just been seen to enter the 
house; they may not remain thirty seconds. If five sharp-shooters can 
instantly adjust to the range and focus their fire upon the windows of that 
small house we shall achieve a deadly result. 

For such service and for general use at the butts, and in matches in time of 
peace, a target sight should possess these characteristics: It should be strong, 
of simplest possible construction, accurate to the last degree and should occupy 
a position of permanent and stable equilibrium. It should afford a choice of 


30 


peep or open sight to be determined by conditions of weather or light, and 
individual eye sight. 

These specifications cannot possibly be fulfilled by a ramp sight. We 
doubt if they can be met at all save by means of a vertical sighting scale, 
and it seems possibly that some part of the success of the American military 
teams in international shoots may have been due to the fact that the United 
States Service Rifle carries a target sight of vertical scale, whereas most of 
the foreign service rifles use a ramp sight. 

Our target sight should be accurately compensated for drift. It should pro¬ 
vide a simple and practical windgauge adjustment. Setting of the sight to 
any range from say 200 yards to 1500 or 2000 yards should be as nearly instant 
as possible. In order that this may be accomplished with one hand it is almost 
essential that there be provided some sort of micrometer thumb screw for 
final adjustment, for the accurate sighting of an ordinary slide with one hand 
when wind is blowing or fingers cold is almost impossible. At the instant of 
tightening a slight tremor of the body or fingers is almost sure to slip it up or 
down. 

Therefore, our specifications must include an instant one hand micrometer 
mechanism. This device and windguage adjustment, like the battle sight, must 
be designed to operate readily and instantly between thumb and forefinger 
of the right hand, and under all sorts of adverse conditions. 

It is impossible to adjust most of the windgauge screws now used on 
military rifles when rusted, or filled with dirt, or with fingers thick as thumbs 
when numbed with cold, but the United States standard service windgauge 
is an exception to this rule, and admirable in all respects, save only that 
the adjusting screw head is so small and so insufficiently knurled that it 
slips through the fingers and can scarcely be controlled when the hands are 
cold or the weapon fouled with dirt. We suggest the use of a windgauge 
screw head more like the knurled trunion head of our battle sight. 

All the above requirements have been successfully met in the combined 
Warner Objective Battle Sight and Warner Sharp Shooters Instant Micrometer 
Sight, both mounted upon Standard United States Windgauge Base with Im¬ 
proved Controlling Thumb Screw, and ready for instant attachment to the 
United States Springfield Service Rifle in substitution for present sight. 

It is today generally admitted that we should organize at the earliest 
possible moment a defensive army of 500,000 men. Such an army will 
necessarily require an adequate corps of aeroplane scouts and plentiful 
support of artillery. 


31 


Granted that these aids will be supplied as a matter of course, the fact 
remains that we cannot possibly place in the field within the near future 
such an efficient army of defence unless we have at once: 

More schools for officers, 

More target ranges for recruits, 

' More efficient battle sights. 


“High courage, sound health, power of endurance, discipline, organization 
and leading under the existing conditions of war all become more or less sub¬ 
servient to marksmanship at the supreme moment of actual conflict with the 
enemy.” 

Field-Marshal Lord Roberts. 


32 




OUR MEXICAN NEIGHBOR 


Suppose we consider a problem at this moment close to home. Upon 
our southern side reside 15,000,000 of our neighbors; men, women and 
children, bleeding, starving, outraged and without hope. Assume that 
we have at length determined, like the good Samaritan to help our neigh¬ 
bor to restore order; to drive away the thieves and robbers who have beaten 
him; to bind up his wounds and start him going. 

This will cost us something, but compared to the humane service we 
should render, the cost both in lives and treasure will be small for a Chris¬ 
tian nation of one hundred million people. Our effort to assist our Mexican 
friends will be contested somewhat hotly by a comparatively small lawless 
percentage of inhabitants, largely composed of bandits and renegades accus¬ 
tomed to live by plunder. 

It will be necessary to employ for a long time many small detachments 
of cavalry and mounted infantry in guerilla warfare, scouting expeditions 
and police work. Much the greater part of this work will have to be done 
in country not only devoid of railroads, but country in which no method of 
transport whatever is possible save upon the backs of animals; a country of 
desert and cactus, fierce heat and thirst, impassable mountains and deep 
canyons. 

I speak with some feeling upon the subject, having ridden several bad 
mounts many a thirsty mile across northern Mexico. Assume a character¬ 
istic engagement such as will often have to be fought out by a troop 
of American mounted infantry against three or four times their number of 
Mexican Guerillas. 

Our troop has been despatched to hunt down marauders say in the 
difficult country four or five days ride west of Chihuahua. We have got 
a machine gun along on a mule and a few — a very few — pack animals, 
but for the greater part are dependent upon the ammunition and food which 
each of us can carry behind his saddle. 

It is the fourth day out and we are working down through a long arroyo, 
following up a clew picked up from a wretched, starving peon early this 
morning back by the muddy little “river” where we camped last night. 
Suddenly from above us along both sides there starts a lively rattle of shots. 

33 


We have got a couple of horses down and three or four men wounded. In a 
jiffy we are all off taking cover among the rocks and cactus and behind the 
dead horses. 

Each of us has got some food and about ioo rounds of ammunition, and 
also, something more precious than food, and hardly less precious than 
ammunition, viz: a canteen three-quarters full of muddy water, for under 
this scorching heat an American can last but a short time without water. 

Our enemy, having superior knowledge of the trails, has scouted around 
and got together enough bands of roving plunderers to outnumber us four 
to one. They have a few Mausers, but for the greater part are armed with 
.30 calibre American rifles. He has also a little water, but there is this 
marked difference: our water will keep us from going under entirely for the 
remainder of the day, but those brown lizards who are after our lives can 
stand it until tomorrow night, and still shoot after we have gone mad from 
thirst. 

Now it all depends upon the shooting. The shooting of the Mexicans 
is bad. They have a superior knowledge of distances, but inferior weapons, 
and the sighting of their gun is an abomination. With them the shooting 
of any range over eighty or ninety yards is going to be absolute guess-work 
and mostly misses, but if we do not by superior shooting get them whipped 
before dark, few of us will see home again. 

They are not in very close now, ranging away from 200 to 500 yards. 
Now if we have got the standard service battle sight, with which we must 
not only guess his distance, as here or there by a movement we discover an 
enemy, but with which we must also guess how much to hold under him, 
we have got a difficult job ahead of us to knock out four to one before dark. 

There, right down the arroyo, I saw a sombrero move behind a bit of 
sage brush. I guess he is about 200 yards away. That means that I have 
got to hold two feet under him, but it is practically level along down the 
floor of the arroyo and the question is, as I lie flat, looking along the flat 
surface at an enemy 200 yards away, where is the spot two feet “under” him? 
It must be about half way from me to him; that is to say, about 100 yards. 

If I try to locate that spot I am practically certain to lose track of the 
particular bit of sage brush, among dozens, behind which I saw him move. 


34 


But suppose that fortunately our squad has got the Objective sight. From 
the instant I got my eye on his movement I have held firmly to his partic¬ 
ular sage brush — only a little grey indistinct patch it is, two feet high. 

I have set the Objective sight for 200 yards. I know that if I have 
guessed the distance right and shoot carefully I am sure to get him. You 
beside me, watching the shot, exclaim “you’re short, I marked the sand 
fly a bit this side.” Evidently in this dry atmosphere and against the heat 
waves I have underjudged the distance, but I have not taken my eye for 
an instant from that tiny grey patch of sage brush which covers an enemy. 

It is the work of a second to throw in another cartridge and advance 
the Objective sight to 300 yards. Again, carefully shooting, firing directly 
at the target we score, for at the shot a straw sombrero rolls into view and 
an arm goes up as the enemy is thrown upon his back, while from his side a 
companion springs up and dashes for better cover, ten yards distant behind 
the flat spreading lobes of a Choilla cactus. 

Now we know his range, and the Choilla cactus is not sufficient to keep 
the two of us in the course of three shots, accurately aimed , with both 
Objective sights set at 300, from stirring him out of his cover with a broken 
arm and out of business. 

Away down the arroyo, up the right hand side, two horsemen ride into 
the mesquite, so far away that they feel perfectly safe, considering their 
experience of the last three years against Mexican fire. They are at about 
500 yards I think. They have stopped in the mesquite, horse high, and 
we can barely see the two sombreros there by watching them intently. If 
we had not seen them ride there and stop we could not possibly detect them, 
and if we take our eye from them we shall not locate them again. 

It looks to you nearly 600 yards. Already you have picked up the 
Objective sight at 600 and I have set at 500. One of us must have been 
right, for at our shots a horse goes down and from the helpless attempt of 
the rider to care for himself as he plunges out of the mesquite, he has evi¬ 
dently got a bad hurt. 

Meanwhile, this same thing is going on throughout our troop, our deadly 
fire being answered by waste of ammunition. The enemy, steadily loses 
hope of a chance to crawl up to his effective range of ninety yards, if not 

35 


under the heat of day, at any rate during the dark. As the sun climbs 
higher, most of them are knocked out, or driven out of cover and before 
noon we are safe. 

I have drawn this little pen picture before a man who shot his way 
out of northern Mexico, getting across after three days and nights of run¬ 
ning fight, with a hole in his arm, and leaving the bones of two comrades 
to be picked by the buzzards, and he swears it is not overdrawn in the least 
particular; that an average troop of American volunteers, furnished with 
Objective sights on our Springfield rifles would whip four times their weight 
of Mexicans right along, because they could make hits which they could 
not make by “holding under” 


36 


SHOTS AT RANDOM 

The Boston Herald says editorially July 28, 1915: 

“This great conflict in unmistakably an artillery war. It is the weight 
of guns that decides the battles, and difficult modern trenches can be taken 
by infantry assault only when their barbed wire entanglements have been 
destroyed by shell fire.” 

The above expression of opinion must have been induced largely by 
the predominence of news despatches from the short English line, entrenched 
as it is, and moving hardly at all from month to month. This opinion seems 
to totally ignore the enormous operations of millions of troops in other 
fields of action where there has been no time to construct entanglements, 
or to entrench, or to bring up any, save the lightest artillery, and where 
the decision of battle depends for much the greater part upon infantry and 
its hits. 

Arms and the Man , with better technical insight into the whole problem, 
hits the nail more squarely as follows: 

“The role of field artillery is to assist the infantry. Artillery alone 
cannot win battles. To rout and disperse the enemy, infantry must ad¬ 
vance and close with him. On the other hand, infantry may not be able 
to advance unless the enemy’s fire is kept down. So the two arms have 
to work together in complete mutual understanding and close co-operation 
in order to accomplish decisive results.” 

The great war has brought to the front very many radical changes in 
military engineering, but the end is not yet. Consider for example the 
proposed aerial torpedo. Imagine 500 pounds of high explosive in its 
brass container, with outspread wings, driven by a small buzzing propeller 
in its tail, responsive to the will of wireless guidance from controlling air¬ 
ship, circling about over hostile fleet, selecting the flag ship, slowly settling 
down like a great blue bottle fly upon a dying beast, alighting upon the 
deck, exploding itself and blowing the flag ship asunder. Very spectacular, 
of course, but on the whole probably not at all impossible. 

Again, there is to be offered a torpedo under wireless control, containing 
in its nose a charge of thermit, which, at the will of the distant operator, 


37 


after the torpedo has selected its victim and pushed its nose against him, 
may, by developing a temperature of 3,000 degrees, readily burn a hole 
in the side of the battleship and crawl into the hole and blow out the bot¬ 
tom of the ship. 

Assuming that these and other startling inventions, however intricate 
and complicated, and however easily upset by counter-irritants in the form 
of violent protecting radio disturbances which may after a long process 
of development and experiment, be finally perfected for defense, and that 
they may, upon occasion, be of some importance, it would nevertheless 
be most foolish for us to stop building battleships until at least one cruiser 
has suffered actual destruction from some such form of absent treatment. 

And the same thing is true in regard to rapid fire guns and the like. 
General French, after nearly a year of bloody fighting against every manner 
of new hostile weapon, declares that “the infantry is still the queen of 
battles.” 

Manifestly, then, the thing for us to do is to meet these new develop¬ 
ments through a development of the efficiency of our infantry by equipping 
it so that it may easily save ammunition and shoot to hit. The military 
authorities of the United States, aroused to the enormous waste of ammuni¬ 
tion by overshooting under present practice, are considering the reduction 
of the service battle sight to a closer range, and we hear possibly to as low 
as 350 yards, but it must be noted that even if this sight be filed down to 
as low as 200 yards, which would be essential for anything approaching 
accurate trench and ambush work, it will then be very badly off in the other 
direction, undershooting by nearly five feet a man 500 yards distant, and 
undershooting by eight feet a horse or man only 600 yards distant. 

This would be better than the present system of overshooting every¬ 
thing but it would be bad enough at best, compared with being able to 
shoot directly at the enemy at any range from 100 to 600 yards inclusive, 
without once removing the eye from the hostile terrain. 

A French observer has declared this to be a war of marksmanship. He 
might better have called it a war of marksmanship needed , in which the 
actual marksmanship has averaged very badly indeed. What else shall 
be said of a war in which one ton of cartridges and ten rifles are consumed 


38 


to kill one enemy, who might have been killed with less than one ounce 
of ammunition properly directed. 

For the ton of ammunition with which the Germans are said to be 
willing to use to kill one enemy, amounts in cartridges, at twenty car¬ 
tridges per pound, to 40,000 cartridges. On the average the shooting of 
about 4,000 cartridges will destroy the rifle, thus using up ten rifles to shoot 
this ton of cartridges to kill one enemy. 

If these ten rifles, with their 40,000 shots now used to kill one enemy, 
were properly sighted and used only effectively enough to make a deadly 
hit once in ten shots, they would kill 4,000 enemies with the same ammu¬ 
nition. 

Every experienced big game hunter knows perfectly well that this would 
be perfectly possible of accomplishment in the hands of well trained marks¬ 
men. We cannot hope to have a volunteer army made up of well 
trained marksmen, but we can reasonably hope to have an army made 
up of men who can do very effective shooting indeed if properly equipped. 

Is it any wonder that “this will be a very long war” if it is to proceed 
on any such a grossly inefficient basis of results as above described? 

If the Germans had devoted less time to goose-step training and more 
time to developing efficiency of rifle fire to a point somewhat higher than 
that required in expending one ton of ammunition to “get” one enemy, 
they might not now be pulling down electric wires and melting up copper 
boilers in the attempt to maintain the tremendous supply of ammuni¬ 
tion required by this wasteful inefficiency of their infantry in battle. 

If the Russians had equipped their Moissant-Nagant rifles with sights 
constructed upon the Objective principle instead of furnishing them with 
crude and inaccurate ramp sights, they might have stopped the Germans 
by making hits instead of wasting precious ammunition and giving ground 
along that far flung Eastern battle line. 

The German practice presents curious contrasts of wastefulness and 
efficiency. The greater part of their infantry are, by reason of their bad 
marksmanship, reduced to the doleful role of “cannon fodder.” On the 
other hand they have a very few expert marksmen who have, with pains- 

39 


taking care, developed a high degree of skill in the use of rifles equipped 
with telescopes, with which they have picked off great numbers of French 
and British officers at long ranges. 

Here again, however, we must not jump hastily to the conclusion which 
one casual American observer has arrived at in his suggestion that “all 
military rifles should hereafter be equipped with telescopes.” The tele¬ 
scope, regardless of its high cost, is not a thing to be put upon an ordinary 
rifle. It involves very great delicacy of adjustment. Its mal-adjustments 
are difficult to perceive, except by careful trial at ranges, and impossible 
to determine satisfactorily in the field. Only a few of the riflemen who 
now have them are capable of keeping them in good condition, and of using 
them well. 

The military rifle gets a great deal of throwing about and rough usage, 
but the rifle carrying a telescope has got to be nursed like a baby, and should 
be entrusted only to the hands of an expert marksman of the highest class 
who understands the extreme necessity of watching over and caring for 
it constantly under all circumstances, protecting it from injury of every 
nature, in order that it may at the crucial moment serve him well in the 
attempt to pick off an officer or a gunner at long range. Even this he 
can only do in good light and when atmospheric conditions do not fog his 
lenses, etc. It may possibly in a good army be justifiable to furnish the 
telescope as well as the range finder to one soldier out of an hundred but 
rarely to more. 

In the face of modern developments in artillery and other arms of the 
service, the infantry if it would continue not only to hold the place to which 
it is entitled, but to enlarge it, must improve its skirmish shooting. 

America, which has produced the submarine, the aeroplane and many 
other modern essentials of infantry support, surely ought not to be content 
to finally allow the infantry itself to go into battle handicapped by such 
an inefficient device as the battle sight now carried by the service rifle. 

In the event of invasion, our very national existence may actually 
depend at the last upon the battle shooting of 500,000 new soldiers, and 
we cannot hope to train quickly recruits for such an army, unless we sim¬ 
plify their task of hitting the enemy. With the United States service sight 
this is now much too difficult. 


40 


The recruit becomes quickly discouraged. He cannot hold under and 
make any hits. He cannot teach himself to believe that to hit a thing he 
ought not to shoot at it. One has only to observe an officer training a 
recruit at target practice with the standard service battle sight to be con¬ 
vinced of this. It seems impossible for him in spite of the warnings of 
the officer behind him, to make himself shoot at the grass in the hope of 
hitting the target. How much more difficult this must be for him in battle. 
It is no wonder that he makes but one hit in a thousand shots, the wonder 
is that he ever makes a hit at all. But with the Objective sight he can 
shoot at his objective, and may confine his attention principally to judging 
distances, for having learned to judge distances his adjustments of sight 
will become automatic. He can now make hits right along at all ranges 
within the crisis of the offensive with no officer at his back to coach him. 

His ability to keep his eye on the enemy and to make hits will speedily 
give him confidence, both in his weapon and himself. The knowledge of 
his superiority over his enemy in this respect will give him courage and 
faith in victory. He will be worth ten men oppressed by the uncomfortable 
feeling that they cannot hit anything; “that the blooming guns all shoot 
about four feet high and it’s all guess-work.” 

The regulars, however few, must always, on account of their superior 
training and knowledge of military technic, form the backbone of defence, 
but their number is now so limited that they will necessarily be called upon 
in great measure to serve as drill masters for the much larger numbers of 
new recruits, who must be hastily trained. 

Indeed, it may very well happen that a good many of us, whose march¬ 
ing feet are not what they once were, and who have long since forgotten our 
manual of arms, will have to brush up and help train new men. 

I think if it should fall to my lot to undertake the work of a drill master, 
I would start off by teaching every man of my company to begin his day 
by reciting to himself a shorter catechism about like this: 

“I will obey orders; 

“I will take good care of my stomach, intestines and feet; 

“I will lie close, dig carefully, keep my eye on an objective and try to 
hit it, for it’s the hits that]count!” 


41 


Imagine a foreign army of invasion once landed and dependent then, as 
always, upon infantry for the actual task of occupation, and attempting 
to contest the field with American infantry persistently trained for six months 
in the judging of distance in the open, and to the use of the Objective battle 
sight for making hits. Can there be any doubt as to what the result would 
be, granted approximately equal competence of command. Surely the 
hit , hit , hit of half a million rifles thus sighted, in the hands of such men, 
would be irresistible. 

Existing systems of training recruits do not devote sufficient attention 
to the matter of shooting under such conditions as the new soldier will 
encounter in combat. The recruit may at targets acquire the fundamental 
knowledge necessary to load, sight and fire a gun, but when he gets into 
the field, either against game or an enemy, he faces a radically new problem. 

He is sure to be somewhat excited. He feels that haste is necessary. 
His objective is indistinct, it moves, it hides, its range is unknown. How 
can he hit it? He cannot hit it but once in a thousand shots, for all this 
involves elements which have had no part in his training. 

If we would make on short notice a good soldier for defense, we must 
not only give our recruit a gun which he can quickly and easily sight ac¬ 
curately to range, but we should give him a little practice in judging ranges 
and firing at moving or obscure objectives. The skirmish run is, so to speak, 
a move in the right direction. Massachusetts Volunteer Militia have 
also occasionally done some field shooting at small balloons tied out across 
the terrain. This has proven to be good general practice, sharpening the 
faculties of observation and teaching the man to judge distance. There 
has, however, been no where nearly enough of such practice and no regular 
system of tests of this nature has been established. 

We have recently proposed for a series of tests in Massachusetts, the 
preparation of an Ambush Problem range, which would, we believe, more 
closely than either of these exercises, simulate service conditions under 
which a great part of fighting has to be done. 

The basic principles of effective fighting from ambush may be condensed 
into a sentence, viz.: “Lie close — save ammunition — save time — make 
hits.” That is to say, make the greatest possible number of hits in the 
shortest possible time without getting hit. 


42 


The Ambush Problem which we have proposed would, briefly described, 
consist of a series of targets in form similar to the standard prone figure 
silhouette, of neutral color and of sizes varying from about ten or fifteen 
inches high to four feet high, set upon sleds or low trucks and drawn across 
the range at every one hundred yards, beginning at ioo or 200 yards 
and terminating at 700 yards. 

Targets to be fastened upon fibre board backs, held erect upon these 
trucks by a cord and spring with powder fuse, which, by the force of a 
bullet blow against the target will be blown, sending up a sharp puff of 
smoke as the target falls. Targets emerging according to a definite schedule 
at one range or another from screens at one side, and passing at a stated 
rate across behind ten small screens of pine trees or similar covering, stop¬ 
ping finally behind a given screen for a stated number of seconds, then 
moving to another and stopping, and finally, if unhit, moving off the range 
to safety. 

Teams of two men to shoot at these targets with a given allotment of 
cartridges, each, for example, with an allowance of thirty cartridges, assist¬ 
ing each other by range guessing, etc. Schedule of target movements to 
be staggered so that, for example, the first target will appear at 500 yard 
range, next at 200, next at 600, next at 300, etc. Schedule of stopping 
behind screens should be similarly staggered so that contestants will be 
obliged to watch the whole terrain keenly and keep their eyes upon the 
moving enemy or upon his hiding place. 

Contestants to be penalized for exposure of body or weapon above a 
height of say eighteen inches. This may be accomplished by arranging 
wire screens in a frame, separated by only one-eighth of an inch and be¬ 
neath which contestants will lie so that the slightest touch of the lower 
screen will cause a contact with the upper, closing bell circuit. 

Score to consist of number of seconds employed in firing, times number 
of cartridges used in firing, plus stated penalties for escape of each enemy, 
plus penalties for exposure: lowest score to win. 

We have prepared specifications and drawings for such a range, copies 
of which we shall be glad to furnish upon request to any of the State or 
National military authorities who may wish to consider the establishment 
of such ranges. 


43 


Officers both of the regular Army and Massachusetts Volunteer 
Militia, by whom this problem has been discussed in detail, have expressed 
hearty approval of the same as an exercise which would greatly stimulate 
interest among recruits in effective shooting under service conditions, 
and give them much needed training in guessing distances and learning to 
hit indistinct objectives. 

We are hopeful that a range for shooting substantially according to this 
plan may shortly be provided in Massachusetts, and we feel that such a 
range might very well be provided in every State for the use of such of 
its militia as have learned the rudiments of loading and firing rifles. 

The shooting of this problem would certainly simulate conditions of 
fighting in ambush better than any established problem, even including 
the smoke fuses which follow the hits, for there would be present to that 
extent the suggestion of return fire from an enemy. 

Target shooting against black bullseyes on white paper at known ranges 
is really but a poor preparation for fighting and field firing generally. In 
Alberta they told me of an English sharpshooter who came out there to 
hunt Antelope, wearing a beautiful display of medals all over his manly 
chest. He confidently expected to ride out onto the plains and knock 
down the first Antelope he saw, but alas, for two weeks shooting he got no 
Antelope, although skilfully brought up by his guide for repeated shots 
at from 150 to 300 yards. He departed, convinced that he did not, after 
all, know very much about unknown ranges, bad lights, waving grass, heat 
waves, and other factors involved in hitting moving game of color princi¬ 
pally resembling its surroundings. 

Dr. Louis Bell, one of our best known American engineers, in an admir¬ 
able article concerning the technical side of preparedness, recently pub¬ 
lished, says upon this subject: 

“The average American starts off as a very bad shot, for the simple 
reason that he has had no opportunity for experience y and even with the 
best intentions it takes a considerable period of instruction to enable a 
man to handle a military rifle effectively, which is the simplest technical 
requirement of war. The writer has seen shooting , not by raw recruits , but 
by militia fairly well trained in other respects , so wild as would discredit a 
small boy with a stone. . . . All this takes time and patient instruction to 


44 


an extent which only can be appreciated by those who have actually tried 
it out, and suitable ranges are very few. . . . The hour has come when 
there is no room for further debate, and if the country is not willing to 
sink into hopeless incapacity it must begin now to look to the defences 
which can be built only with toil and time.” 

In closing these random comments upon this subject, so vital as it is 
to national safety, I can do no better than to quote a line from the Edin¬ 
burgh Review, which, in discussion of lessons of the Napoleonic Wars, 
said long ago: 

“An army is used in war — it can only be trained in peace.” 


45 


EXPERT OPINIONS 

MR. ADOLPH O. NIEDNER 

Mr. Adolph 0 . Niedner is one of our best known American authorities on rifle design 
and construction. He is a German by birth, and was a scout with General Crook in the 
campaign against Jeromino in the lava beds of Arizona about 1880, during which he was 
shot through the body and across the head with 45-70 bullets. 

Always a big game hunter and always a rifleman, he has for twenty-five years been 
constantly at work developing and building rifles and rifle sights and conducting experi¬ 
ments in ballistics. 

Mr. R. L. Warner, Malden, Mass., February 8, 1915. 

50 Congress St., 

Boston, Mass. 

Dear Mr. Warner: 

I am familiar with the sights employed upon most of the rifles of the world, including 
the military arms of all the civilized nations and there is not the slightest doubt in my 
mind that no sight on any arm in the world is in the same class with the Warner Objective 
Sight, for skirmish work or between forces entrenched at varying ranges, or in fact for any 
condition of service in actual combat. 

It would be simply invaluable to troops in warfare, and would in my opinion, between 
even numbers of men, unquestionably turn the tide in favor of forces thus equipped. This 
sight would make sharp-shooters out of rookies in three months. 

Very truly yours, 

(Signed) A. 0. Niedner. 
GENERAL CHARLES K. DARLING 

General Darling is well qualified to express an opinion upon this subject, having been 
a constant student of military affairs. As a regimental commander he did much to keep 
his command highly efficient in marksmanship. He had active service with the Sixth 
Massachusetts Regiment in Porto Rico in the Spanish War, and is now a Retired Brigadier 
General of the Massachusetts Volunteer Militia. 

Mr. Robert L. Warner, February 1, 1915. 

50 Congress Street, 

Boston, Mass. 

My dear Mr. Warner'. 

I believe you have made in your Objective system of sighting small arms a contribution 
to that hitherto rather neglected art, which is bound to meet with the recognition it deserves. 

To change from the puttering, almost painful, and under service conditions impractic¬ 
able, manipulation of the sighting devices now in use, to an adjustment so easily effected 


46 


that the sight is no longer a troublesome appendage to the rifle, is certainly a great advance. 
But when to that is added the substitution of an objective for a subjective state of mind 
in the user, his eye being constantly on the object aimed at, instead of on a vernier scale, 
or on the ground somewhere in the vicinity of the object (unless indeed that object has 
accommodatingly fixed itself at the presently adjusted range), your accomplishment is 
so far beyond anything heretofore attained in the sighting of arms that your device has 
only to be known to meet with general, if not universal adoption. You have made it possible 
for one always to aim at what he wishes to hit, and not at the general terrain in the hope of hit¬ 
ting what he is not aiming at. 

The simplicity of the mechanism by which these ends are attained is in my opinion 
some measure of the greatness of your invention. A member of that profession, one of 
whose striking achievements has always been to me its ability to throw a bridge,—arched» 
cantilever or pontoon — with an eye to where it should land, I am sure you must have 
brought to this new problem your training as an engineer in thus centering upon the all- 
important point in a bullet’s flight. 

Whether or not I have correctly surmised the process by which you brought about this de¬ 
sired result, I certainly do congratulate you on its completely successful accomplishment. Of 
its great value from a military standpoint there cannot be the slightest doubt. It will inevitably 
reduce the present monstrous waste of ammunition in war, and enormously increase the 
effectiveness of fire, whether at an enemy partially concealed or in the open, and thus 
make for morale, fire control and consequent efficiency. 

Very sincerely, 

(Signed) Charles K. Darling. 
CAPTAIN STUART W. WISE 

Captain Wise is one of the best military rifle shots in America. He is Captain in the 
Ordinance Department of the Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, assigned to the Coast 
Artillery Corps. He was high man in the International Competition at Buenos Ayres 
in 1912. At the great Tournament at Wakefield, Mass., in 1913, attended by some five 
hundred military rifle shots, Captain Wise made the remarkable score of 103 consecutive 
bullseyes at 800 yards, in view of which his opinion in regard to the Instant Micrometer 
is of particular interest. 

Mr. R. L. Warner, Boston, February 17, 1915. 

Boston, Mass. 

Dear Sir: 

After using your Objective Sight at Wakefield last week, both in slow fire and in a 
skirmish run, I feel that the following special merits of this sight, over any other which 
has been produced up to the present time, should be especially mentioned. 

In skirmish firing, which is the nearest approach we have to actual service conditions, 
there is the necessity of keeping in mind a dozen essential features, all of which must be 
brought into play within a limited time. I was greatly impressed with the fact that this 

47 


sight eliminates two of the most difficult of these factors, viz.: adjustment of the sight 
to range, and attempting to remember changes of range and measure with the eye a certain 
number of inches under the distant silhouette upon the bank. 

The setting of this Objective Sight from range to range was instant, and after a week’s 
usage I am certain it would become subconscious and automatic. Its use enabled me 
to give over the attempt to measure down the bank , and for this uncertain and difficult 
practice there is substituted direct firing at the target at every range. We may now eliminate 
from skirmish firing practically all thought of sight, and all thought of holding under , and 
concentrating our whole mentality firmly on the mark. 

Skirmish teams equipped with these sights would unquestionably have a great advant¬ 
age over teams using any other military sight heretofore produced, in fact I do not see 
how it would be possible for other military teams to compete with them at all in skirmish 
firing. This, of course, amounts to the same thing as saying that infantry provided with 
these sights in service would have a marked advantage over the enemy. 

Of course another very important advantage is that the elevation-may be either raised 
or lowered at will without removing the eye from the objective, which, in shooting at 
targets at unknown distances, which may appear at unexpected times and places and for 
only brief intervals, is of great importance. 

At a test made about two years ago by the State of Massachusetts at West Barnstable, 
platoons were brought unexpectedly into sight of large white balloons on the end of wires 
at unknown distances. The invariable mistake was to overshoot, although the distance 
was only about 450 yards, and I believe had the rifles been equipped with your sight the 
amount of ammunition necessary to explode these baloons would have been very much 
reduced, and the supply of ammunition is one of the most serious problems of modern 
warfare. 

In regard to the target sight, using the peep I believe that your new micrometer adjustment 
is one of the greatest improvements which has ever been brought out, and I shall look forward 
with great interest to using one of these in open matches this year wherever the sight used is 
optional. This will do away, in my opinion, with carrying micrometers or verniers, as the 
adjustment is fine enough to answer every possible requirement, and it is simple enough 
so that anyone can readily use it, whereas the vernier is always open to a mistake through 
lost motion in the thread, or a mistake in the reading, where I have often seen an error of 
ten points made. 

Very truly yours, 

(Signed) Stuart W. Wise. 
CAPTAIN JAMES H. KEOUGH 

Captain Keough is a veteran drill master, and is widely known as a successful com¬ 
petitor in many military rifle matches. He was a member of the team of twelve United 
States riflemen selected to represent the United States in the International Match at 
Bisley, England, in 1903. This team, on which Captain Keough was high man, won the 
match at Bisley and brought home the Palma trophy. He was also top man on the United 
States team which won the Palma trophy at Ottawa in 1912, and he saw active service 
in the Spanish-American War. 


48 


Wakefield, Mass., February 8, 1915. 


Mr. R. L. Warner, 

Boston, Mass. 

Dear Sir: 

Having watched the development of your Objective sighting system from its crude 
beginning three years ago to its present state of perfection, I can truthfully state that 
you have in the Objective Sight that which has long been sought but which has not here¬ 
tofore been produced, i. e., A sight that is objective in every sense of the word because 
it is possible to aim at the object desired to hit at all distances and because it is not neces¬ 
sary to take your eye from the object, once it is located , to make a change of sight should it 
be deemed necessary on account of misjudging distance, which, in my opinion is the greatest 
advantage the sight has over others and should prove to be of inestimable value in actual 
warfare as practiced today. 

It seems to me that in the past, too much stress has been paid to the danger space of 
a rifle, with fixed sight, under the assumption that a man would be standing when shot 
at and which actual service proves to be otherwise. Such theory does not always work out 
as intended as may be shown by our own Government Battle Sight on the U. S. Magazine 
Rifle (point blank range 530 yards) and which I may add has not been improved upon by 
any other nation. Verification of my claim may be attested to by many prominent rifle 
shots of this country, many of them of admitted skirmishing ability, who have “also ran” 
in our National and Divisional Competitions because they forgot to, or were unable to, 
hold from 20 to 30 inches under the skirmish figure they desired to hit and which task was 
made doubly difficult by some deformity of the ground shot over or by the failure of the 
marker to put the figure above the embankment the same distance each time. No wonder 
it takes 1000 rounds of ammunition to wound or kill every man in the average battle when 
the men have such a crude form of sight and when experienced skirmishers, who have been 
firing for many years cannot take the average rifle (without being doctored) and place 
20 shots of a skirmish run in the figure at known distances and none farther away than 
600 yards. If such is the condition in time of peace, what may we expect of the raw recruit 
in time of battle and shivering from cold and exposure? To aim at an object other than 
the one desired to hit is a thing that can hardly be accomplished even by the hardened 
veteran and a thing which it is even impossible to consider in the training of recruits as 
they simply cannot he taught to shoot 2 or 3 feet under an object in order to hit it. All of these 
obstacles you have overcome in your Objective sighting system which will make a real sharp 
shooter out of every man of ordinary intelligence in a month or less and this might never 
be accomplished under the old system of holding under. 

Yours truly, 

(Signed) James H. Keough. 
SERGEANT BILL RYER 

When Bill Ryer was moose hunting with me near the Canadian line in Maine last 
November, he was constantly debating whether or not he should go back to Nova Scotia 
and volunteer, and after seeing me shoot and himself shooting my various rifles with object¬ 
ive sights, begged me almost with tears in his eyes to find some way of fixing him up with 
one in case he went to the front, saying: 


49 


“I just know I could get a lot of the enemy with that sight who will get away from me 
if I have got to try and shoot three feet under them to get them. In open country ioo 
good men armed with this objective sight in a two days’ fight in average scattered cover, 
could lick 300 equally good men armed with ordinary battle sights.” 

After I came home, having killed a good bull on Thanksgiving day, thanks to Bill’s 
skillful tracking, he volunteered and is now a Sergeant in the 26th Canadian Battalion 
in camp at Folkstone, forty-two miles from the firing line, and as he says “soon to leave 
for the Dardanelles.” In recent letters he says: 

“How I wish we had your objective sights. For God’s sake do your darndest to get 
them for us before we leave for the firing line. Our blooming guns shoot about four feet 
high, and its all guess-work.” 

The Canadian volunteers are certainly up against a hard proposition to make any 
hits with the very good Ross rifle using standard battle sights. Even so good a shot as 
Captain Keough, with the Ross we had out at the Wakefield range, after repeated attempts 
to do any consistent shooting whatever over the battle sight, gave it up as practically im¬ 
possible at average ranges within “the crisis of the offensive.” 

Just imagine the Canadian troops entrenched, firing at the advancing enemy at 500, 
then 400, then 300 yards, as they come on, shooting four or five feet over their heads, 
making practically no hits; the enemy gaining courage as a result of such an ineffective 
defence, while themselves making a fair number of hits owing to the fact that their own ramp 
sight has its low range — its battle range — at 200 yards. 

It seems hardly doubtful that this extremely ineffective battle sighting of the Canadian 
rifles was responsible for a great part of the fearful casualties suffered by the Canadian 
troops who first reached the firing line, amounting in one case, we are told to 75 per cent, 
of a regiment. 

To those of us here who had an opportunity either to shoot the Ross rifle at Wake¬ 
field, or to see it shot, first with standard battle sight, then with Objective sight, it is not 
at all doubtful that if the rifles of these Canadian Regiments had been equipped with 
Objective sights, the casualties to the enemy would have been enormously increased, with 
corresponding reduction of the casualties among the Canadians. It is scarcely doubtful 
that just this difference in sighting would have increased their hits ten fold. 

COMMENTS OF A MATHEMATICAL RIFLEMAN ON THE 
“ZONE OF DANGER” SYSTEM 

Mr. R. L. Warner, Cambridge, Mass., February 15, 1915. 

Boston, Mass. 

Dear Sir: 

There is a theory of fire control, known as the zone system, which asserts that as much 
harm will be done by inexperienced men firing at random as by good rifle-shots using all 
possible care in sighting, range-finding, etc. This theory rests on the assumption that 
the good shots will not be able to adjust their sights properly, and so will group their shots 
in the wrong place. The absurdity of this is so obvious that refutation seems hardly 
necessary, but it can be readily demonstrated mathematically. 

50 


If two large bodies of troops, equal in number and 600 yards apart, are firing at each 
other on the zone system, the men lying down in the open without cover , the chances of any 
man being hit in the course of an average day’s fighting (300 shots per man) would be 
13 out of 100. The theory, on which some fire control systems rest, thatmen will stand 
up in the open to be shot at, is utterly preposterous. In making these computations I 
have assumed a very generous measure of accuracy, and, having regard to the number 
of flesh-wounds which do not incapacitate a man for further action, the chances of a man 
being put out of action in the course of three hundred shots if he lay prone in average cover 
probably would not be above one out of 100. That is, to put it another way, it would take 
30,000 shots to put a man out of action. This checks fairly well with the figures from 
the Russo-Japanese war, where it took 20,000 shots to kill a man, the difference being 
accounted for by the fact that some soldiers will not follow the zone system implicitly, but 
will sight carefully. 

There is a singular tendency at present manifest to foster military drill in the schools 
and colleges, while utterly ignoring rifle shooting, the real work of the soldier. Surely 
there can be no doubt that the most important thing for these young men to learn is the 
use of their guns under conditions approximating as closely as possible those encountered 
in actual field service. Even where rifle practice is required in educational and volunteer 
military organizations, it is of little value, since the sighting of the gun, the most difficult 
part of rifle shooting to master, is on an entirely different principle from that used in war¬ 
fare, and most militiamen below the grade of sharpshooters never have attempted a skirm¬ 
ish run or fired a shot over a battle sight. And this practical training for the mass of the 
young men always will be impossible until an objective sight, useful alike at the targets and in 
the field, is adopted for all practice with the military type of rifle, both standard and miniature. 

Yours sincerely, 

(Signed) Edward P. Warner. 

The writer of the above letter is a member of the Senior Class at Harvard University, 
and a careful student of the principles of ballistics and rifle fire. He was a member of 
the Harvard Rifle Team which won against Yale in 1914, and high man on his team. 


51 


CLIPPINGS 


“Braver men than these Germans do not exist, but it is the bravery of men who have 
been taught to lean upon each other and not the cold, self-contained, resourceful bravery 
of the man who has learned to fight for his own hand. Two corps of our men held five of 
your best, day after day, from Mons to Compeigne. Lord Roberts has said that if ten 
points represent the complete soldier, eight should stand for his efficiency as a shot. The 
German maxim has rather been that eight should stand for his efficiency as a drilled marion¬ 
ette. It has been reckoned that about 200 books a year appear in Germany upon military 
affairs, against about 20 in Britain. And yet, after all this expert debate, the essential 
point of all seems to have been missed — that in the end everything depends upon the man 
behind the gun and his hitting his opponent and upon his taking cover so as to avoid being 
hit himself” — Sir A. Conan Doyle to General von Bernhardi. 

When a great volunteer army has to be raised-quickly for defense, the thing which 
they most need to learn and which under existing systems of sighting is the most difficult 
to teach them, is to shoot to hit. The instructions given by Earl Kitchener at London 
September 2nd, 1914, to the officers who were engaged in the work of getting his volunteer 
army into shape, read as follows: “Never mind whether they know anything about drill. 
It doesn’t matter if they don’t know their right foot from their left. Teach them how to 
shoot and do it quickly .” 

The importance of artillery support for infantry has been emphasized in press despatches 
during recent months largely because of the fact that those certain armies from which 
we get our news are nearly all closely entrenched. Before they got entrenched, however, 
and were able to bring up artillery, the fate of Paris was decided in the battle of the Marne 
and infantry decided it. 

Said a British soldier wounded at that battle: “When you saw a rush start you thought 
that nothing on earth could stop it. That these tremendous charges were stopped and 
the attackers driven back in disorder is due, in the first place, I am certain, to the magnifi¬ 
cent marksmanship of the British soldier.” 

How much more effective will be the marksmanship of the British soldier when his 
weapons are so equipped as to enable him to make instant and accurate adjustment to 
range under every imaginable condition of service. 


“ARMS AND THE MAN’’ 

From Article by Lieut. Townsend Whelen, April 10, 1913 

“The accuracy which we can now attain with the service rifle is limited by the sights. 
We cannot progress further in this direction without an improvement in sighting devices.” 

The foregoing statement is especially interesting not alone from the nature of it, but 
also on account of the recognized talent of the writer and his great experience. 


52 


“Teach the Man not the Mass” 


“The truth is that the higher the skill of the individual men in the line the better the results 
which one may expect from their fire. That seems a self-evident fact, but it has taken a 
war demonstration to prove it to some doubters. 

“Do not run away with the idea that we say individual instruction is everything and 
that there must be no training in fire control and fire direction, but effective fire from 
rifles is not delivered in volleys, except in isolated cases. The moral effect from volleys 
midst the roar of machine guns, and from artillery, when bursting shells are adding their 
clamor to a bedlam of sounds, is nothing. 

“What you want is an infantry line in which each man is firing at a definite object and 
firing to hit. It is the shots which hit that count. Volume is nothing, direction is everything. 

“No country has officers more able than those found in the American Army and Navy, 
but the general indifference of the public has made it impossible to do more than a few 
of those things which should be done if we are to avert the storm which must inevitably 
come on.” 

While we shall, when this storm comes on, sorely need submarines, aeroplanes and 
very large amounts of medium calibre light artillery, we shall need more than all else 500,000 
men who can shoot to hit. 


“OUTING” 

Errors in “Zone Firing” 

“Even with the modern rifle it is still necessary to hit a reasonable number of times in 
order to disturb seasoned troops greatly. Mere weight and speed of fire soon lose their 
terrifying effect. Furthermore, it is doubtful if marksmanship has kept pace with gun 
development, especially on the Continent. The general tendency of green troops is to 
hold high, particularly in the excitement of an engagement. Many men will blaze away 
into the air in the vain hope of landing somewhere to the detriment of the enemy. Given 
this style of shooting plus a high-speed bullet and flat trajectory, and the result will be 
pretty consistent over shooting, even at known ranges. 

“This inaccuracy is to be accounted for on two bases, both of which are reasonable. 
In the first place, there is the tendency referred to above to shoot high in excitement. 
The second explanation lies in the accepted German theory of “zone” firing. This rests 
on the assumption that a particular area can be so sown with bullets that it will be impos¬ 
sible for anything to live in it or to advance through it. Therefore, the German soldiers 
are trained to fire from conventional position — which may or may not be adopted in the 
heat of engagement — and without attempt to aim at either individual or mass. If the 
theory could be carried out to the full and the zone sprayed with bullets as with water 
from a hose, the results would justify the assumption. But here enters in the average of 
inaccuracy to upset the practice. Errors in aiming and holding are bad enough when 
troops are coached to hold on the target — whether the target is a bullseye, a living man, 
or an advancing mass. How much more serious must they be when the attempt is merely 
to drop as many bullets as possible into a given portion of the terrain. Rifle bullets are 
not shrapnel and individual marksmanship is still important, no matter what the type of gun.” 

53 


“THE AMERICAN FIELD” 

December 26, 1914 

“Statistics of the great wars of the world show a startling condition in the inefficiency 
of the combatants as marksmen. In some battles it is shown that as many as three thousand 
shots are discharged to one combatant killed; two thousand shots to one combatant killed 
is a common showing. Do not these figures carry their own lesson ?” 

They do and the lesson is that the combatants have almost universally been provided 
with weapons with which it was impossible for them to be good marksmen under service 
conditions because of ineffective battle sighting. 


ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL 
February 13, 1915 

John F. Clapham, First Lieutenant, 19th Infantry says: 

“The short-comings of our present sight have been well demonstrated at Camp Perry* 
and the micrometer which has been so generally used in connection with it, ought to have 
its adjusting feature incorporated in a new sight before long” 

This we have now accomplished in the Warner Sharp-Shooters Instant Micrometer 
Sight. 


“THE RIFLESHOT,” LONDON 

“A vast amount of the shooting at the front is evidently being done at 20-100 yards, 
and as the sights of the rifles cannot be lowered below 200 yards, reliance must be placed 
on the flat trajectory and careful aiming as low as possible” 

In reference to this it may be said that neither the German Mauser nor British Lee- 
Enfield has any peep sight for target work, which sharp-shooters invariably require for 
accurate long-range shooting, nor any compensation for drift. If the ramp sight were 
readily adjustable for short ranges, these difficiencies might be overlooked, but it is not so 
adjustable without getting up on one’s elbow, getting over above it, looking carefully 
down upon it and working it carefully forward while exposing the body to the enemy’s 
fire. 

In view of the close work between the European trenches, and considering the extreme 
ease with which we can set our target sight for long ranges, I am strongly inclined to believe 
that Objective battle sights for all military rifles should read 100, 200, 300, 400 and 500 
yards, thus covering with deadly accuracy in battle what French officers are accustomed 
to call “The crisis of the offensive.” 

“One most valuable — one might almost say vital — factor in full range shooting that 
is utterly ignored by rifle clubs is distance judging ; this again is very strange, for not only 
is the practice most interesting, but it leads at once to scouting work and the sharpening 
of the observational faculties.” 


54 


“If there is one thing more than another that this war has proved it is that every atom 
of scientific knowledge one possesses must be brought into the fight, no device, however 
refined in its adjustments, can be neglected if by its use advantage can be gained.” 

“There has been lots of ammunition wasted from rifles and machine guns on both 
sides, but the substitution of machine guns and automatic rifles for the infantry weapon 
would result only in greater waste of ammunition.” 

“Superiority in one quality can best be met by showing superiority in another. If 
the allies cannot produce so much equipment as the enemy, they can equalize by using 
it more effectively; the fewer the guns, or the shells, the better must be the marksmanship .” 

“We cannot make guns enough, or shells enough, or cartridges enough, to keep on 
shooting all over the enemy country. We can very easily supply guns and cartridges 
enough to shoot at least once a week at every German in the firing line. When soldiers 
and artillery are really efficient shots they will shoot to hit , and when they hit, but not until, 
the enemy will go under.” 

“What we cannot produce in excess of our requirements is marksmanship .” 

“Thus, it seems that the new musketry method of “plastering an area” with bullets’ 
however good it may be in theory, is impracticable; therefore, supplies of ammunition 
being limited — now, as always — success will attend that side shooting straightest.” 

“Rifles are the weapons with which battles are lost and won.” 

PRESS DESPATCH 

“The land-locked Swiss republic, officially and nationally, is strictly neutral, but there 
are many evidences as to the way in which individuals permit their thoughts to lean. 
An enterprising post card manufacturer has gotten out a card bearing the caption: 

“The Kaiser in the Country of the Best Rifle Shots.” 

“Under the caption is a picture of the helmeted, spurred, booted and armed War Lord, 
looking at a simple Swiss soldier who has just sent a rifle bullet through the heart of a far- 
distant target. Under the picture is the following: 

“And so, my son, says the Kaiser, there are 100,000 shots like you in Switzerland. 
But suppose I came with 200,000 Prussians!” The soldier replies: “In that case , your 
majesty , we shall each of us fire two shots” 

The preparedness for defence, which has caused the Swiss republic to be so carefully 
left alone by the warring nations who surround them is evidently not so much a matter 
of artillery as one of individual rifle marksmanship. 

THE SIEGE OF ADRIANOPLE 

“Their present lines face those of the allies only a few hundred yards away. The armis¬ 
tice has given them time to prepare strong positions. They will not be easily driven back, 
and especially as they are well covered by the fire of the magnificent Ottoman forts, which 
form the inner circle of defence about four kilometers from Adrianople. These modern 


55 


forts are deadly. Seen from the besieging positions, even through the strongest binoculars, 
they resemble merely broad unsodden sp^ts of clay level with the ground in some distant 
pasture. 

“To find their vulnerable points with hostile shells is thus extremely difficult. Yet 
somewhere in that yellow area, safe behind mounds of solid cement, though they cannot 
be distinguished, project the snouts of the great Turkish guns, ready to discharge missiles 
half as big as a man the moment fighting may be resumed. 

“Picture the renewal of battle. Chill rain falls continually, gathering waist deep in 
the trenches, which hold it like so many bathtubs. In it shiver the soldiers, some with 
their rifles ever resting in apertures waiting to shoot if a Moslem head should show over 
those misty earthworks, three hundred yards across the valley. Now and then a rifle cracks. 
Now and then a far off cannon crashes and wheezes. The rain thickens. It is hard to 
see. An officer speaks a word of command. A hundred drenched and miserable men crawl 
forward out of the trenches, and, stooping low, trot down the hill. 

“Suddenly they are discovered by the Turks, A straggling volley spits through the 
rain. From the trenches of the allies it is answered vigorously. Another company of 
men leap out and run heavily down the hill . When they reach the bottom they drop behind 
hummocks and stones and add the crackle of their rifles in the general uproar .” 

Fancy the waste of ammunition in attempting to hit enemies thus entrenched or hidden 
among hummocks and stones within 300 yards, with battle sights which over-shoot four 
feet at this range. Imagine attempting any adjustment of the present standard sights 
in such conditions of weather as this; but the Warner Objective Battle Sight is designed for 
and perfectly adapted to exactly these conditions. 


56 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


Springfield Rifle with standard service sight 











Lee Enfield Mark III British Rifle with service ramp sight. 






co 

D 

s 

< 

PC 

H 

X 

o 

co 

o 
£ 
►—» 
co 
< 
W 
pc 

V 

£ 


H 

o 

►—I 

CO 

w 

> 

HH 

H 

U 

w 

m 

O 

w 

£ 

pc 

< 

£ 

K 

H 

i—i 

£ 

W 

fa 

w 

S 

<J 

CO 

























German Mauser, ramp sight lowered. 



German Mauser, ramp sight raised. 



British Lee Enfield, ramp sight lowered. 


This ramp sight, as well as Mauser, almost impossible to adjust with cold wet fingers. Under most 
favorable circumstances both of them still require considerable movement 
of body and removal of eye from objective. 

































Warner Objective Battle Sight, set at 400 yards on U. S. Springfield Service Rifle. 



Warner Objective Battle Sight, set at 600 yards on U. S. Springfield Service Rifle. 



Warner Objective Battle Sight, set at 500 yards, rear view. 

These changes from range to range are made instantly with fingers numb and cold 
and without once removing eye from objective. 































Battle sight at 200 yards. 


Instantly shifted to 300 yards. 


Instantly shifted to 400 yards. 


By similar movements shift instantly to 500 and 600 yards, beyond which it cannot go and upon return it cannot 
come back below 200 yards. By carrying slide on target sight at bottom 700 yard range can be obtained objectively 
by picking up leaf with forefinger without removing eye from objective, for with slide on leaf at lowest point the 
aperture reads 200 yards and open sight 700 yards. 



Setting micrometer slide at iioo yards Locking same in position with forefinger 

BY THUMB PRESSURE ONLY. AGAINST LOCKING NUT. 

Views above show this operation being performed with leaf vertical. It will be found much easier to perform 
the operation with leaf laid down, or as Captain Wise prefers, with leaf held up Yi inch by thumb of left hand under 
and against leaf while left hand grasps the barrel. Note that all operations, both of battle sight and target 
micrometer, are performed by thumb and forefinger of right hand only. 





















Warner Objective Sight on British Lee Enfield Service Rifle. 
Setting micrometer slide at 600 yards. 



Warner Objective Sight on British Lee Enfield Service Rifle 
Locking micrometer slide at 600 yards. 

































Canadian Military Sight on Ross Rifle. 



Warner Battle and Target Sights on Ross Rifle. 




















































A trophy of Objective Sighting. Plains of Alberta, October, 1912. 


HUNTING WITH OBJECTIVE SIGHTS 


I spent several weeks in the fall of 1912, camping and hunting in Alberta, east of the 
Rocky Mountains. For a hunting guide I had Jasper Demaris, a French-Cree half-breed — 
an extraordinary hunter of long experience, who had at various times guided several world- 
famous hunters of big game, including prominent members of the English nobility. 

These experiences had brought him into contact with all manner of fire arms and equip¬ 
ment. I had with me at that time an 8 m. m. Schoenauer-Mannlicher rifle, fitted with an 
objective sight from one of our earlier models which, though somewhat crude, was neverthe¬ 
less effective. The shooting which I could do with this rifle against small game about the 
plains, such as badgers, coyotes, etc., while keeping our attention entirely concentrated 
upon the movements of the game, greatly excited the admiration of Jasper. The experi¬ 
ences of one particular day will suffice to illustrate. 

We were riding through the edge of Bad Lands above the Bow River when Jasper ex¬ 
claimed, “See the kit fox, he’s just under that yellow bank, don’t stop. Ride around the 
other side of me and then dismount — he’s about 100 yards.” This fox, almost the color of 
the bank, was hard to see at best, but I finally got my eye on him, and using Jasper for 
cover, slipped from my horse. 

Setting my Objective Sight at 100 yards, I was about to fire when the fox observed me 
and sprang up from the bank, running like a flash through the short grass. Suddenly he 
stopped — I could barely see him in the grass from having watched him run there and stop. 
“200 yards” said Jasper. Instantly and without removing my eye from him, I set the 
Objective Sight at 200, and by careful aim had the good fortune to catch him. At the shot 
he sprang straight up into the air, and was dead when we got to him. “By Gar, Boss, what 
a sight!” exclaimed Jasper. 

After skinning him, we rode on for some hours, and about four o’clock, sighted among the 
low rolling hills a band of fifteen antelope, distant two miles. By a circuit we got into the 
hills to windward, and leaving our horses, crawled to the brow of a hill sparsely covered with 
low sage brush. The antelope is keen-eyed as an eagle, and the slightest movement will 
attract his attention. It was nearing dusk, and a brisk wind was blowing. 

Lying prone behind a tiny bush, rifle ahead, with binoculars I located the buck with two 
does on the edge of the plain, the remainder of the does scattered out on the plain. Without 
binoculars it was impossible to distinguish the buck, and shooting does was illegal. “300 
yards!” said Jasper. Eye on the buck I shifted the Objective Sight to 300 and fired. 
“Right under him!” cried Jasper, “400 yards.” Buck and does made two or three stiff¬ 
legged jumps, the buck crossing the does. Impossible to distinguish him except by watch¬ 
ing him constantly. Advancing sight to 400 I fired again. “Right in front of him,” said 
Jasper, “You got the range but mind that wind.” 

An antelope is a very small mark indeed in the dusk out on the yellow plain. At this 
shot they ran swiftly a short distance and stopped. “500” cried Jasper. Again shifting 
the Objective Sight, eye never once removed from the buck, I fired again. “Right in front 
of him again” said Jasper. Now they came at full speed along the edge of the plain, and 
out on to the plain, stopping short two hundred yards distant, irresolute, having seen no 
movement anywhere. Back came the Objective Sight to 200 yards, and at the shot the 
buck fell. “By Gar, Boss,” said Jasper, “what a sight.” 

67 


For thirty years I have been shooting various kinds of rifles in various parts of North 
America, from Newfoundland to Mexico. All these rifles have been pretty good, but the 
sights have all been bad under one sort of outdoor condition or another, when considered 
as fine instruments of precision designed to direct rifle fire accurately at game. 

I do not now speak at all of sights designed to direct rifle fire accurately at targets. 
Shooting at game involves quick action at unknown ranges, under brilliant sun light, or 
evening shadows, in fair weather or foul. A great many manufacturers all over the world 
turn out excellent rifles for large and small game, and everyone of them comes from the 
hands of the manufacturer with sights illy adapted to one or all of these conditions. 

It is either a sight fixed for one range and adjustable only by a screw-driver, or a sight 
which may be set up or down by jumps to unknown ranges, or folding leaves which either 
flip up or down as struck by particles of brushes, etc., or are rusted tight so that they can¬ 
not be moved at all. If you take one of these rifles and buy for it a special sight adjustable 
by any method offered in the market, you are a shade better off, but just a shade. 

Not only that, but the sights such as they are, are often badly set or of improper eleva¬ 
tion for any practical purpose. I recall Mr. David Abercrombie telling me that not long 
ago a friend of his, a manufacturer of rifles, who knew that he was about to start on his 
fall hunt, sent to him a special new, fine rifle, inviting him to try it. 

When “Dave” took his first shot at “that buck” it did not drop. Nor did it at the 
second shot, although “ Dave” is a very old hand at the game. Thereafter he got right 
back to camp and “tried out” this special sporting rifle against a large piece of paper, to 
discover that as sighted it only shot about two feet high at ioo yards. 

I have never been able to understand why the manufacturers of rifles appear to be 
so indifferent as to the accurate sighting of their guns, particularly when it is considered 
what a large proportion of rifle purchasers have no chance to test out their guns before 
going into the woods, or else buy them at back country points where facilities for doing 
anything to the sights even after they have been tried out and found wrong, are entirely 
lacking. 

I recall with chagrin paying $75 for a fine foreign rifle to take on a western trip. This 
gun had a German silver front bead sight which could not be filed down without destroying 
it, and at the rear, one fixed leaf and one folding leaf, reading 100 meters and 300 meters 
respectively. Fortunately I did try it before starting West, and found that at 100 meters 
the low leaf shot ten inches high and eighteen inches to the left. I got out of this trouble 
after a fashion by buying new sights at Tacoma. 

Lieutenant Townsend Whelen, than whom there is probably no better known American 
authority upon this subject, in a recent contribution to the rifle press, tells of a friend who 
purchased a new rifle with which he particularly wished to be able on occasion to trim 
partridge heads at ten yards, to hit small game like woodchucks at fifty yards and to make 
certain of his deer’s foreshoulder at one hundred and fifty yards. 

He purchased a fine special sight and, with Lieutenant Whelen’s help, after several 
hours shooting at targets, had been able to determine the number of minutes of angle and 
other data to which he should adjust the same for these several purposes. Lieutenant 


68 


Whelen does not say so, but he undoubtedly did, among other things, determine that 
having set this sight correctly for trimming partridge heads at ten yards, he was obliged 
to drop the sight a certain number of minutes of angle for accurate work at fifty yards, 
and afterwards to raise it back past the first elevation for accurate work at one hundred 
fifty yards; all rather a confusing operation to remember and perform when in the woods 
and when, just after trimming your partridge head you may hear the crash of a buck 
emerging from a dead-fall and stopping just an instant in the edge of the clearing. 

I cannot help wondering whether Lieutenant Whelen’s friend, when he goes hunting 
next fall, will remember, or find the card on which he noted last fall, what change of minutes 
of angle he needs to make for adjusting his sight for these various ranges, or whether he 
will not have to start all over. 

A device for over-coming all these difficulties can now be so easily constructed and is 
so simple, that it seems ridiculous that it was not thought of and employed long ago, especi¬ 
ally when one considers the great amount of annoyance and disappointment from ineffective 
shots due to established forms of field sighting which have been suffered by innumerable 
sportsmen for generations. 

I can offhand recall many such experiences as the following: 

One autumn about twenty-five years ago I was camped near a river in southern Oregon. 
Across the stream was a brakish lick favored by the deer. Watching in the evening I 
saw a deer come into the lick. I had a Marlin 40-60 rifle with aperture tang sight, and it 
was just at dusk. 

I had fired this gun at a target enough to have got the sight adjusted accurately to 
100 yards, and had a notch filed in the vertical rod to hold the setting, but, alas, when I 
tried to find the deer in the dark through the aperture, the aperture was gone. My eye 
simply could not discover it and the deer at the same time in the bad evening light under 
the great spruces. 

Luckily I was able to look along side of the aperture, outside of the sight, to obtain 
my elevation, and by pure guess-work managed, in spite of it, to get my deer, but it was 
no thanks to the sight. 

About fifteen years ago one November morning in the snow I was hunting deer along 
a mountain side in Maine. I had then a Winchester 30-30, with tang sight for good light 
and a plain bar set into the barrel for use in bad lights. As we tramped along the mount¬ 
ain side an occasional shower of snow descended upon us from the over-ladened spruces. 

Just as one of these white showers descended a doe trotted across in front of us, a moment 
later followed by a fine buck, who stopped at about seventy yards. It was rather confusing: 
the shower of snow and the sudden appearance of the deer, and helped to upset my shooting 
as such things will always do just at the moment when you sight big game. 

Something was wrong, I could not see the buck, and by the time I discovered that the 
aperture was full of snow he was on the move, and by the time I could throw the tang 
sight down and shoot across the bar, he was on the jump, so that I only got a nice handful 
of thick hair out of his mane. 

So much for aperture sights in bad lights and in snow. For my own part I long ago 
discarded them absolutely for big game hunting. They are always getting fogged up 


69 


with pine needles, dirt or something just at the critical moment. I do not say this in 
disparagement of aperture sights for target shooting, for there is nothing better for that 
purpose. The latest American and English aperture target sights are beautiful examples 
of workmanship in this class, although by reason of their many small parts, etc., they 
are unsuited for the rough conditions of field service. 

Upon the occasion of my going West with the foreign rifle above mentioned, I took 
along my old 45-70 Winchester, with aperture tang sight, as a reserve. I first spent some 
weeks sheep hunting in the Fraser River country, and while I did after three weeks contin¬ 
uous hunting succeed in getting two good rams, it was small thanks to my sights. I had, 
owing to various circumstances over which I had no control, including the sights of my rifle, 
consumed all of my foreign ammunition and was obliged to fall back on the 45-70 when I 
went down into a lower country for goats and deer. 

I had at this time become accustomed to the use of open sights in hunting, but the 
old aperture sight on the 45-70 was all right for standing game, and I got two good Billy 
goats without any difficulty. I was, however, very anxious to get a good mule deer, for 
I had never shot a first class head of that species. 

We therefore moved a day’s march into a fine deer range high above Bridge River, 
and I rode off along the benches of the mountain early in the morning with my Indian. 
It was very raw and cold and after two hours of riding I sat huddled together in the saddle 
chilled through. Suddenly Jack ahead of me exclaimed: The Stag! The Stag! Pulling 
my rifle from the holster I dismounted and sat down just as the stag burst into full flight 
out of the bottom of a little draw below us, going right up the other side across from us. 

I simply could not find that jumping stag through the aperture. Every time I nearly 
got him into it he was gone out of it, and he was certainly a dream of a stag. My four shots 
at him were all utterly ineffective, for they became, under the circumstances, only the 
wildest guess-work. 

For my part I always wish to see my game over the sights, to watch the game, to shoot, 
and, if I miss, look up, watch, aim and fire again without feeling around, trying to find 
the aperture in a tang sight, a thing which I believe to be impossible by ninety-nine percent, 
of men when shooting quickly at moving game, and it all moves. 

But difficulties are not confined to aperture sights alone. On one of my Mexican 
trips I went out on to the Pacific Coastal desert facing the Gulf of California, to hunt 
burro deer. These burro deer are but little known, in fact, no naturalist has ever mentioned 
them at all, so far as I can learn, excepting Mr. E. S. Thompson, who describes them as 
the desert mule deer. The few sets of horns of these deer which I had seen in the camps 
of Mexican hunters had been beautiful sharp pointed spreading trophies, and my heart 
was set upon getting one of these bucks. 

I had then an 8 m.m. Schoenauer-Mannlicher rifle with 100 meter fixed rear leaf sight 
and 300 meter folding leaf. With a good Yaqui Indian I hunted across the burning sands 
of that desert for seven days, tracking these deer. They are great travelers and live in a 
bad country. 

We had at length trailed one “macho,” which Don Romero declared with many gestures 
to be a “grande macho,” all one day across the desert and through illimitable wastes of 

70 


cactus and mesquite, and camped on his trail at night with no water for our two saddle 
animals and only enough in the canteens to keep our own throats from cracking. 

In the morning we took up his trail again, and after some hours, worked it into some 
small hills covered with thick growths of mesquite and various kinds of cacti. Leaving 
our horses we worked about on the trail on foot; Don Romero’s eyes on the ground — mine 
ahead scanning the cover. 

I had constantly kept reminding myself, as I always try to do under such circumstances 
to “shoot low, shoot low, shoot low,” and had kept my thumb on top of the 300 meter leaf 
to keep it folded down so that I might be certain to shoot over the lower sight. 

Suddenly he arose out of the thicket at sixty yards —just his fine head and neck show¬ 
ing and slowly turning towards me. At my hiss the Yaqui stopped and crouched, and I 
saw that the deer would stand but a second. With careful but quick aim I fired — and he 
was gone. Alas, that 300 meter leaf had'scraped against the last bush I passed and stood 
up so that I overshot him and I saw him no more. 

Thereafter I tightened up the hinge of this 300 meter sight by tapping the ends of the 
pin-bearing with a little hammer, whereupon it rusted tight so that I never again could get 
it up, except by prying it up with a screw-driver. Every sportsman who has shot a rifle 
much at game has had many such experiences as these. 

Now the question is: What are we going to do about it? What practical means can 
be devised to get rifle hunters out of ninety per cent, of the trials they now suffer from the 
imperfect sighting of their rifles. We are not attempting to do anything for the rifleman 
who is devoted to target shooting. We want to help the many who are devoted to the keen 
health-giving manly sport of hunting game with a rifle, and who rarely if ever shoot at a 
target. We want to help this ninety-nine per cent, of riflemen. The other one per cent, 
are already well able to take care of themselves. 

If we were able now to obtain an ideal hunting sight, let us see how we should describe 
it. We must recognize that this is in one respect a finer game than battle sighting of 
military rifles, for it must cover a greater variety of ranges and objectives. Battle sights, 
beginning at 100 yards, increase steadily in height as the ranges advance. Rear hunting 
sights beginning at 5 or 10 yards must, at first step or two, decline and afterwards be raised. 
On the other hand we need not deal with as great ranges as in military sighting nor provide 
for drift or windage. On the whole, therefore, our problem is greatly simplified as com¬ 
pared with that which we have encountered in the attempts to completely cover all these 
points in a successful combination military sight. 

In attempting to dictate specifications for such a sight which shall be commercial, 
that is to say: very inexpensive so as to be available for all riflemen and not alone for the 
man of leisure or wealth, we encounter quite a problem. 

First a word as to front sights. For hunting, the front sight should be an open sight, 
for a covered sight will fog in the dusk. It may be guarded at the sides if desired, although 
so far as my own experience goes this is unnecessary, for in thirty years hunting, in all manner 
of country on foot and upon horseback I have never yet injured a front sight. 

As to the choice of forms, whether it be a bead, sloping wedge, or square top and face; 
that is a matter of taste, but for my own part, after experimenting with every conceivable 


71 


form of sight, and almost every kind of material, I prefer a square topped, square faced 
rather broad front sight of steel, faced with silver or ivory. 

This square front sight should be used with a square notch in the rear sight, so pro¬ 
portioned that when sighting, the top line of the front sight is held level with the top line 
of the rear sight — a clear line of light appearing each side of the front sight in the rear 
sight notch. This form of sight and notch were called to my attention four years ago by 
Mr. Niedner and described by him as the Partridge sight. Said he: “You will think that 
a very coarse sight, but you will be greatly surprised to find what fine work you can do 
with it.” 

And I have been greatly surprised for the more I use this form of sight the more I find 
that its accuracy is not affected by variations of sunlight Or shadow. The top line of the 
front sight always comes true with the top line of the rear sight — there is no shifting 
bright spot to throw me off four or five inches at ioo yards, and most marvelous of all, it 
seems to greatly restrain overshooting when firing quickly offhand. 

I have several times at ioo yards fired offhand rapidly at a paper twelve or fifteen inches 
square; nailed to a tree and half obscured by twigs; first five shots with a rifle carrying 
bead front sight and V notch, then five shots with a rifle carrying Partridge sights, with 
the usual result that the V notch-bead combination will average at the top of, or off of the 
paper, and the Partridge sight combination will average three or four shots out of five into 
the paper; the difference in elevation between the two forms of sighting averaging perhaps 
ten or twelve inches. 

The great importance of this characteristic will be recognized by every sportsman ac¬ 
customed to quick shots at moving game, and while I can speak only of my own experiences 
in this connection, the result in my case has certainly been a marked improvement of my 
shooting at deer in the woods and similar game. 

An ordinary blued steel front sight of this form is perfectly satisfactory except in the 
dusk, or when shooting down in among dark tree trunks and roots at small game or partridge 
heads. Such conditions necessitate a visible front sight, and I have found silver very 
satisfactory, although ivory is slightly better if carefully constructed and protected. 

I wish that manufacturers would make their front sights adjustable sidewise. Possibly 
economies of production, forced by keenness of competition forbid this, but the present 
method of hammering the front sight over sidewise for adjustments is most unsatisfactory, 
for it frequently will not move at all until it moves too much. I have my own front sights 
all provided with a tiny set screw on each side, whereby very fine and permanent adjust¬ 
ment is made possible. 

As to the rear sight, here comes our real problem. First as to location. It should be 
set well back upon the barrel, close to or over the chamber. This is the safest and best all 
around place for a hunting sight. A tang sight if whipped up quickly may strike the eye. 
Even assuming that it be an open sight, it does not so quickly catch the eye at that point 
on jumping game as it would if set upon the chamber. 

If set upon the chamber, the sight comes near the center of gravity of the gun, so that 
if the gun be held comfortably in the left hand, the setting of the sight by the right hand is 

72 


readily accomplished; whereas with sight set six or eight inches away from the center of 
gravity, the adjustment of it by the right hand introduces a condition of unstable equilibrium 
and a wobbling about of the gun at a very critical moment. 

As to the sight itself, most of the specifications for a battle sight apply equally to 
the hunting sight; for example, it should read distinctly in yards, should be very simple, 
of very few parts, impervious to sand, snow, rust or dirt, very firm in standing where 
put but responding instantly to adjustments, even with coldest fingers. In a word, it should 
be immovable if brushed against external objects but should not stick an instant when 
any adjustment is desired. 

Every adjustment should be made by a controlling button projecting on the right hand 
side of the barrel and operated by the simplest forward or backward movement between 
the thumb and forefinger. Starting at 5 or 10 yards for tack driving accuracy at close 
ranges, the sight must drop to next desired range, and after passing the point where the 
line of sight stops crossing and touches without crossing the curve of the bullet’s flight, 
must be raised to hit subsequent ranges, but all these changes from lowest to highest range 
must be effected by forward rotation of the button, starting from lowest range, so that 
the operator need never take upon his mind for an instant the thought that in advancing 
his sight he is at first lowering it and afterward raising it. 

He should proceed from range to range with his mental processes reduced to the simplest 
terms — just the subconscious mechanical forward movement of the button under his 
thumb for a forward movement of the range. The operation should be upon the “object¬ 
ive” principle, that is to say: the hunter should be able to keep his eye fixed upon his 
objective while adjusting his sight instantly to the desired range. 

The ranges to be selected for objective sighting will be determined largely by the rifle 
used. On my little .22 low power automatic, 5 yards to 100, with three intermediate set¬ 
tings are sufficient; my 45-70 has 10 yards to 400, with four intermediate settings. Mani¬ 
festly a sight with settings as thus determined and marked will be suitable only for that 
particular class of rifle, which is as it should be, for we are not trying to get into the sight 
business, but we are trying to perfect a sight so effective and so simple and so inexpensive 
that the manufacturer can afford to put it on the rifle as a part of its regular equipment 
when it leaves the shop, and it is not a more serious matter for him to determine the design 
of sight for this particular rifle than it is for him to determine the design of a hammer or 
trigger for this particular rifle. 

If our sight can be designed to meet these requirements, while costing no more, or but 
a few cents more than the inaccurate and impractical devices with which factory rifles 
are now sighted, we shall enable the manufacturer to put his gun out thus equipped without 
raising his price, while doubling its value to the sportsman. 

It is certain that rifles so equipped would simply take the market, as against rifles of 
the same class, as now sighted. 

After a most exhaustive study of these specifications by mechanical engineers and expert 
model makers, and the expenditure of considerable sums of money in experiments, we are 
satisfied that there are three general mechanical methods and only three whereby these 
ends may be satisfactorily achieved. These three we have perfected and by construction 
of model after model simplified and we believe reduced to their lowest terms. 


73 


Nearly ten years ago I almost determined to go at this problem and work it out, but was 
goaded into actually attempting it by the events of a trip to Newfoundland in September, 
1911. I took upon that excursion the Mannlicher which I had used in Mexico, and for small 
game a nice little ten shot American automatic .22 calibre rifle. 

This small gun was provided with an open sight which could, by means of a screw¬ 
driver, be set up or down, and which would stay where it was set sometimes as much as 
two or three days. There was no means of marking it or of knowing for which range it 
was correct. 

When we got well camped on the Southwest Gander River, we targeted this gun and 
set it accurately for ten yards, so that it would be useful in shooting ptarmigan heads. After¬ 
wards, by experimenting at rocks along the edge of the water across the river, I tried to 
form some idea of about how much I must “hold over” in order to hit a duck or similar 
game at 50 or 60 yards. 

One fine day with “Bob” Brooking, my hunting guide, I had got settled down on a 
little stony island in the midst of a great area of bog to watch for Caribou. The usual 
does and fawns and young stags passed up the wind across the bog, and high noon came 
with no worthy stag or any other game in sight. 

Three geese came honking over and circled around to light in the edge of a bit of water 
300 yards away. Watching through the glasses I concluded that by much crawling I might 
get into a low bit of cover which “Bob” declared was eighty yards from the geese. With 
the .22 rifle I made the crawl and got into my cover at the closest possible point much 
besmeared with mud and hopeful. 

Then arose the old, old problem of how much to “hold over” on that non-adjustable 
rear sight to hit a goose in the water at eighty yards. I doubt if there is any man born 
who can do consistent good work “holding over” and “holding under.” The shot fell 
into the water short of the gander. The second shot, made hastily, went over his back. 
At the third they were gone. 

Passing over experiences on that trip with the heaver game gun and its leaf sights, and 
they were sad enough, I will follow the subsequent history of this .22 rifle enough to indicate 
what was accomplished at the beginning of the development of Objective sighting. 

Before leaving Newfoundland I had devised and sketched out roughly a design for 
the first Objective sight, and upon reaching Boston asked Kirkwood Brothers to tell me 
the name of the very best expert I could get to take up with me the work of its develop¬ 
ment and construct any models. Acting upon their advice I made the acquaintance of Mr. 
Adolph O. Niedner of Malden, who needs no introduction to American riflemen at my hands. 

He received my sketches and specifications with gravity and departed without com¬ 
ment, but returned in a few days to express his unqualified approval of the idea of Objective 
sighting, and to say: “If you can work out and perfect it, you will confer a first class blessing 
on rifle hunting men.” 

Neither the limits of this booklet, nor its main purpose, afford opportunity to relate in 
detail the long process of development of the Objective sighting idea that followed, nor to 
describe the numerous mechanisms which were constructed with the assistance of Niedner 


74 


and other experts who afterward became associated with the work. I will confine myself 
to a few special instances of actual use of rifles objectively sighted, merely to illustrate 
the practical results achieved. 

The last Objective sight made for this .22 rifle, which I still have on it, reads accurately 
at the following stopping points, viz.: 5 yards, 10, 40, 70 and 100 yards. By accurately 
I mean that it will drive tacks at 5 yards, shoot comfortably into a four inch bullseye at 
100 yards and is relatively good at intermediate points. 

No setting was adopted between 10 and 40 yards because between these two points 
the bullet crosses over the line of sight and drops back again so that there is but small 
necessity for changing sights between these points. This means, of course, that start¬ 
ing from absolute accurate setting at 5 yards, the rear sight drops sharply to 10 yards, 
and is raised but slightly at 40. 

This is not a high power cartridge, and tolerably accurate judging of distances and 
sight setting is essential to good work, but it is a very dear little gun for all around purposes 
at small game. After I got the gun thus accurately sighted upon the Objective principle 
I was going down to my rifle range at Concord one day with an Italian gardner, who said 
as we came to the turn in the road: “Meeester Warniere, dare ees one wooedchuck which 
is eatun up all my esparagoose. ,, “Where does he hang out, Jim,” I asked. “Right along 
dat wall,” said Jim “ ’mong dose san hummocks.” 

That was about 65 or 70 yards from the turn of the road. As we came back up from the 
range I stood there for a moment, looking out to the asparagus and suddenly noticed a 
small black head peek over one of the hummocks. I could just see it — a tiny object about 
the size of ones fist, motionless and impossible to detect had I not seen it move. 

Keeping my eye on him I steadied the small gun against the trunk of a pine, and setting 
the Objective sight to 70 yards, aimed with extreme care and fired. He did not move and 
I almost concluded I had missed him, but could not escape the feeling that with that accurate 
sighting and the distance known so closely, I must have got him and sure enough, he was 
stone dead with a tiny hole through his skull —just about the same distance as the great 
big gander which, with the same little gun, I had missed so badly in Newfoundland before 
the invention of the Objective sight. 

Last fall this same little .22 rifle was with me down in northern Maine on my moose 
hunt. Good old Sergeant “Bill” Ryer, of the 26th Canadian Battalion, was tremend¬ 
ously tickled with the Objective sights, and during the hard crust, still-hunting being 
impossible, used to play with this .22 constantly. 

He would sit by the wood pile watching for red squirrels and mice at 5 or 10 yards, 
setting the Objective sight back and forth as he saw them peek out here and there at the 
nearer or farther range, and shooting their heads off right along. 

One evening while engaged in this pastime he heard a partridge fly up down by the 
little trout stream below camp, and saw it light in a birch tree to pick its evening meal of 
buds. He tried in vain to show the bird to me in order that I might take the shot, but 
even himself could not be sure of it except that he had seen it light and had his eye right 
on the very spot. 


75 


“It’s about 65 yards,” said Bill, and never looking from the spot, set the Objective 
sight of the little .22 calibre rifle at “70,” held the barrel firmly against a convenient post 
and at the shot the bird came fluttering down. One look away from her to shift sights 
would have lost her. Any guess-work of “holding over” or “holding under” would have 
been equally ineffective. 

The very first of these Objective sights which’I made was arranged for a 9 m.m. Schoen- 
auer Mannlicher rifle, and is still being used on that same gun by my friend, Mr. Clement 
Ford. He utilized this equipment in his hunting of moose and caribou in New Brunswick 
tiyo years ago. He returned a most enthusiastic convert to the Objective sighting principle. 

He said “I should not have got my moose but for that sight. We had called and 
hunted a good deal without success, when one afternoon a bull, responding to the call, 
came out to the edge of a bog across from us and began to work along up the edge of the bog. 
He was a long way off at first and I could barely see him now and then — a black object 
or just a black spot moving about or standing among the green alders. 

“I never took my eye from him or from the spot where I had seen him, but set the Objective 
sight at 500, and as he moved along the bog, coached by the guide to “400,” and “he’s 
about 300 now,” and I watched and watched, reducing the sighting range without taking 
my eye from this objective which I had come so far to see. 

“He was in no hurry to come along the edge of the bog and it was nearly an hour before 
he had got across from us, about 200 yards away. I could only then see a piece of his 
foreshoulder about as big as your hat, and would not have known if that was a piece of 
him if I had not seen it move. But I knew the guide was good at distances and I knew 
the Objective sight was set at 200, and, firing with extreme care I had the satisfaction of 
hearing him fall crashing over.” 

In the field a man is usually obliged to guess his range; even with the help of a native 
guide this is sufficiently difficult. When he is obliged also to guess how far under the object 
he must hold, or how far over it he must hold, or what fraction of an inch he must look over 
the top of his rear sight to adjust his fire to the range, his confusion is ten times compounded. 
Single guess-work is bad enough, double guess-work multiplies the error tenfold, and also 
creates rattled nerves, panic, buck-ague and all that. 

Life itself, in fact, has for more than one sportsman, depended upon his ability to do 
this double guess-work with the chances all against him. The press despatches state 
that Stefanson, who has been lost in the North now eighteen months, had with him when 
last seen only a few hundred cartridges. If he is still alive, consider for a moment how 
priceless each one of those few cartridges has become, and how costly “a miss” must be. 
If he is still alive he cannot afford on his life to make anything but hits. 

I recall reading long ago of an Arctic hunter with a small party, reduced almost to 
starvation. He was attempting to stalk a seal. Crawling slowly toward it at the edge 
of the ice, 200 yards away, suddenly at 50 yards at a small hole in the ice appeared the 
head of another seal. The slightest movement would alarm it; he could not adjust his 
sights; he tried to “hold under” and naturally missed. At the shot his first objective seal 
disappeared and he was forced to return to his starving companions empty handed. With 
our Objective sight he could instantly have made certain of a deadly shot. 


76 


Under such circumstances the Objective sight would be worth its weight in gold, in 
fact, under circumstances far less critical than these, I have often seen a time when this 
sight would have been worth its weight in gold to me. The weight in gold of the simple 
Objective sight on my 45-70 Winchester would be $18.61. The ability to make hits of 
grand game trophies instead of missing them at the critical moment, after expending hund¬ 
reds or thousands of dollars upon equipment and travel, and after weeks of toil, would 
often have been worth many times $18.61. 

Even my good old 45-70 Winchester, a rather back-number gun, judged by modern 
standards, is still a very deadly weapon against game now that I have it equipped with 
one of the very best of my Objective sights, and exactly correct at 10 yards, 50, 100, 200, 
300 and 400. I can trim a partridge head with it at 10 yards, turn right around without 
ever looking at the gun, instantly setting it to absolute accuracy to any one of the other 
ranges for any other shot I choose to make. 

One who has not tried it can hardly imagine the delight of using rifles thus sighted. 
The ability to adjust sights instantly and accurately upon seeing game, whether far or 
near, multiplies the pleasure of rifle hunting. Field shooting becomes a new story and for 
an humiliating waste of cartridges, for the chagrin of seeing great game escape, wounded 
or unwounded, there is substituted the satisfactory knowledge that if one will keep even 
moderately cool and shoot carefully, accurate results are entirely within his own control. 


The End. 


77 













































































































































































Woodland Caribou. A Fine Head. Newfoundland, 1911. 
















- 























































■ 















































































































































